

Inventing Prescriptive Decision Analysis

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The problem: What is prescriptive decision analysis?

- Widely recognized that:
 - Most classical normative theories are descriptively inadequate with no “easy fix”
 - Normative / descriptive opposition should be replaced by a “prescriptive” synthesis (e.g. W. Edwards et.al. 1992; Bell, Raiffa, Tversky 1988)
- But what are desiderata for a prescriptive methodology?
- What “integrates” behavioral and normative considerations?
- How do you recognize a good answer?

Problem has significant philosophical and methodological dimensions which are neither purely formal nor cognitive-behavioral.



Some normative and behavioral desiderata for prescriptive decision analysis:

- Some formal-normative foundation for values, uncertainties, outcomes, choices
- Allow for multiple and sui generis values
- Multiple and constructed measures needed for multiple values
- Bounded rationality implies second-order decisions about decision-making process: the normative theory should generate effective heuristics
- Should coherently address constructive aspects of decision-making processes: What are the formal correlates of constructive choice?
- Normative theory should afford robust learning without requiring perfection

The goal restated: Integrate normative theory with behavioral constraints through a constructive learning process



Methodologically, the desiderata imply a “neo-aristotelian” decision theory

Behavioral decision theory

- Modern abstraction of preferences across outcomes (e.g. Savage)
- Multiple values and tradeoffs
- Constructed measures
- Bounded rationality
- Central role for heuristics
- Decision-making as a learned practice
- Value-focused thinking
- Uncertainty

Nicomachean Ethics

- “Practical syllogism” as near equivalent in Aristotle of the logic of preference and choice E.g. MA 701a
- NE 1141a: “Good not a single feature...”
- NE 1137b: Need for “flexible rulers”
- NE 1095a: “Beings with our capacities...”
- NE 1095a: “Precision appropriate to area....”
- NE 1179b: On learning and decisions
- NE 1141b: “Stochastic arts. . .”
- Physics 1976: Luck as only relevant to choice.

If Pascal created the first modern decision-theoretic argument, then Aristotle was the first behavioral decision theorist.




But, *applied* multiattribute utility theory also largely realizes the desiderata

- ***“Applied” means the formalism plus a constructive process using heuristics based in the formalism***
 - Construction of values and development of a value hierarchy
 - Construction of measurement criteria and utility functions
 - Formulation of tradeoffs, conclusions, and learning
- ***Relationship between mua and constructive processes understood***
 - Gregory et.al. 1993, on constructed values and mua
- ***Logical role of constructive process identified in the formalism***
 - Redefinition of value hierarchies
 - Redefinition of measurement scales and associated utility functions
 - Arrow’s Theorem on impossibility of aggregating values

So: Applied multiattribute utility theory is an excellent example of a prescriptive theory, and is strongly “neo-aristotelian” as well.



Characterizing “prescriptive decision analysis”



Applications (1)

- Nussbaum and Sen (eds.) *The Quality of Life* 1993
 - Practical neo-aristotelian, mostly social-economic characterization of quality of life
 - Has unrecognized behavioral/mua consequences and simplifications
 - Some incorrect ideas about multiple values and their proxies
- United Nations 1996 *Human Development Report*
 - Capability metrics are mua-style constructed measures
 - Possible confounding of value tradeoffs with econometric measures
- *Therefore: Another bridge between behavioral and economic theory*
 - Fischhoff 1991 et.al on contingent valuation and constructed values
 - In this case, more “methodological harmony”



Applications (2)

- NAS *Understanding Risk* 1996 and others on the analysis of values in environmental policy, stakeholder roles, etc.
 - Interdisciplinary, behavioral, and prescriptive approach to environmental risk a methodological inevitability
- Applied multiattribute utility theory as the “formal logic” of neo-aristotelian ethics and behavioral decision theory
 - Behaviorally-oriented, multiple-valued “utility” has effectively negated and superceded classical utilitarianism and “utility”