BOOK REVIEWS

Ordinary Prussians: Brandenburg Junkers and Villagers, 1500–1840. By William W. Hagen. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press. 2002. Pp. xxxiii + 679. $100.00. ISBN 0–521–81558–4.

English-speaking research on Central European agrarian society keeps humiliating German-speaking research by providing in-depth monographic studies in Social History that — with few exceptions mainly for the eighteenth century such as Medick's and Schlumbohm's work — do not easily find their rival in German books. William W. Hagen has put himself with this major book in one line with Tom Robisheaux, Bob Scribner, David Sabean, and Tom Scott. His study is a "must" not only for specialists on Brandenburg agriculture, agrarian society, or social relations in the countryside, but for anyone interested in a more balanced picture of the nature of early modern rural German society. It is difficult to identify any one reason for this apparent superiority of English-speaking scholarship in this particular field. However, it is probably fair to allege that the older traditions of German constitutional history — inferring social reality from legal constructs — and the more recent argument on "communalism" — invoking social reality mainly from pamphlets — provided a pincer movement that undermined the legitimacy of the kind of painstaking and difficult research that Hagen now offers and that remains the pride of English-speaking scholarship on Early Modern Germany in general (see Robert v. Friedeburg, "Die ländliche Gesellschaft um 1500," in *Zeitschrift für Agrargeschichte und Agrarsoziologie* 51 [2003]: 30–42). Indeed, Hagen's work is able to reject a number of alleged received wisdoms and to enrich our current knowledge to a significant degree.

Decades after Hartmut Harnisch's work on Boitzenburg, we have here the first and only detailed study of a Brandenburg estate and its villages, complete with chapters on demography, agrarian income — both for the estate and the villagers — accounts on the nature of local conflict and the meaning of royal intervention, and mirroring a number of major economic, social, and political changes in the long period it covers. To be sure, mirroring here means that by reading this book, we learn what actually happened as opposed to inferring it from legal records or, worse, from the prejudices of nineteenth-century liberal or East-German Marxist historiography.

The study shows that agriculture, both of peasants and estates, was commer-

cial, profit-orientated, and producing reasonable wealth both for the noble estate owners as for the peasants. It shows that serfdom in the area did imply the ability to recruit manual labor, but did not imply arbitrariness, and that peasants could defend themselves not least legally, with the support of the royal courts. Hagen, a now unrivaled master in converting the superb sources he had in his hand into calculations of income, can show that peasant net incomes after taxes and services did actually rise during the eighteenth century, as did the noble income from the estate itself (pp. 324–25). As average grain surplus and its market value rose considerably during the eighteenth century, the share of grain tributes, taxes, and commutation fees from the market value of the actual grain surplus of the peasant farmers fell from about 50 percent to 36 percent. While Hagen readily acknowledges that received clichés about East German serfdom have long been cast into doubt, he is entirely right to claim that his study is the first to back up this suspicion with actual data on what went on.

Also, his study is able to put the considerable amount of conflict between peasant farmers and the noble estate-owners into perspective, describing the role of royal courts and the patterns of conflict and cooperation. Further, his study highlights the existence of a considerable nonlanded group of poor people, for which the actual peasant farm-holders had no concern, other then keeping them away from their purse (p. 589).

A number of clichés dissolve as this study presents its evidence. There was both conflict and cooperation between the noble estate and its main and principal peasant farmers. Royal courts did protect farmers in a number of instances against incursions of the estate owners. Access of peasant inheritors to the farmsteads was basically secure. Noninheriting siblings of inheritors joined the local landless poor. Agricultural change and innovation, sometimes with substantial investments, increased agrarian profitability, both for the estate and the farmers, and left both a clear-cut profit. The peasant farmers, though not legally as independent as their western counterparts, had sufficient muscle and royal support to defend their own rights.

Some minor problems do occur. Reference to the work of Heinz Reif, Wolfgang Mager and, recently, Jenny Thauer on a 1700 patrimonial court in Brandenburg would have allowed to portray the current state of research as slightly less prone to unwarranted clichés than is sometimes acknowledged. Also, the distinction between West and East German agriculture should not have been completely abolished. Rather, Hagen's view could have been squared with evidence from Gregory Pedlow's excellent study on the estate economy in Northern Hesse during the eighteenth century. There, more often than not, enforced services were due to princes themselves rather then to the estates owned by the inferior nobility, whose income rested to a much more significant extent on fixed rents. We should not throw away, in reevaluating the state of research, the baby with the bathwater. None of this, however, diminishes in any

way unqualified praise for Hagen's book, which has to be understood as a standard work on its subject and, by virtue of its importance for Early Modern Central European history as a whole, a standard work for anyone interested in this broader field.

ROBERT V. FRIEDEBURG
ERASMUS UNIVERSITY, ROTTERDAM

Citizens and Aliens: Foreigners and the Law in Britain and the German States 1789–1870. By Andreas Fahrmeir. New York: Berghahn Books. 2000. Pp. 258. $69.95. ISBN 1–57181–717–4.

Since the early 1990s, scholarship on citizenship has revolved around the binary opposition of two ideal types of citizenship regimes and conceptions of national identity proposed by the sociologist Rogers Brubaker. This opposition distinguishes between an ethno-cultural, descent-based conception expressed by the *ius sanguinis* and exemplified by post-1871 Germany and a national-state, territorial-based conception expressed in the *ius solis* and exemplified by France. In this ambitious and successful revision of his University of Cambridge history dissertation, Andreas Fahrmeir escapes the constraints of this artificial polarity, explicates a multifarious and technical evidentiary basis for legal enactment and administrative practice, and in so doing provides a far more nuanced analysis, sensitive to the complexity, variation, and change over time that characterized citizenship policy in Germany and Britain through the first two-thirds of the nineteenth century.

Fahrmeir's book is innovative in three ways. First it is truly comparative, not only between the two hypothetical extremes of "Germany" and Britain, but also within the variegated states of the German Confederation, drawing primarily upon the states of Hesse (Hesse-Darmstadt, Hesse-Kassel, the Duchy of Nassau, and the Bavarian Palatinate) but also the states of Thuringia and larger kingdoms such as Prussia and Bavaria. Second, it focuses squarely upon what Fahrmeir persuasively identifies as the neglected era in migration and citizenship studies, namely that which falls between the cameralist migration policies of the ancien régime and the full-fledged "modern" citizenship regimes of the post-1871 era. Fahrmeir chooses this time frame precisely because it allows him to see the transition to the modern system of citizenship regulation. Third, the author braves the territorial, legal, and administrative complexity of the German states in the German Confederation, looking at multiple state-level and local legal frameworks and actual administrative practice of at least the four states of Hesse with regard to every issue that he examines, and he has consulted an enormous number of difficult and technical archival and printed sources.

In pursuing his ambition to "reconstruct the legal and administrative definitions of citizenship in the nineteenth century," to gain insight into the "official mind" of those who administered the citizenship regime (p. 5), Fahrmeir methodically examines the panoply of issues surrounding the concept in chapters that treat citizenship, naturalization, passports and the control of foreign travelers, as well as residence abroad. He then devotes a chapter to explaining the differences that his study establishes between the British and German citizenship regimes, and provides a conclusion that connects his work to the ongoing debate about the nature and origins of nationalism between "primordialists" and "modernists." Indeed, Fahrmeir's analysis throughout remains broader than his title suggests.

His goal is explicitly revisionist: to overturn the received conception that states, during the transition from a society of estates or ranks to a society of citizens formally equal but divided by fissures of class, lacked interest in monitoring and influencing migration and thus paid little attention to the bundle of rights bound up in the concept of citizenship. He liberates the citizenship policies of the German states from overdetermination by subsequent developments, showing how in the early nineteenth century they adopted citizenship policies *not* based on the law of descent and that did *not* distinguish between "German" foreigners and non-"German" foreigners. These policies sought rather to gain for the German states the military advantages of the French model of a society of equal citizens and to codify a new consensus in legal theory that a citizen could not be expelled from his state of citizenship involuntarily, while continuing to control the economic burden of providing poor relief as well as the new brew of revolutionary ideas, including that of nationalism. In Germany, domicile became the key to citizenship, and the emergent citizenship regime favored the grant of citizenship to any person possessed of sufficient economic and cultural capital to acquire legal domicile in a given state. The complex maze of citizenship laws of the German confederation drew no distinction between "German" and non-"German" foreigners and thus advanced no arguments about descent or "blood."

Naturalization, passports and the control of travelers, and the rights and treatment of resident aliens became test cases to establish the limits and contours of this regime. Naturalization could be formal, by private act of Parliament or royal warrant, by means of a uniform naturalization statute administered by officials who had substantial room for discretion, or informal, by virtue of extended residence abroad (usually with the attendant loss of one's original citizenship), by marriage to a foreign citizen, or by adoption by a foreign citizen. Fahrmeir treats each of these methods at length, outlining the legal and regulatory framework and records of actual practice, including such statistics on alien population and naturalization as he can find or construct, both for the states of Hesse and for Britain. He finds that the states of Germany actually naturalized a greater

percentage of culturally alien foreigners than Britain did during the period under study, and that tests of cultural assimilation such as language proficiency were innovations of the late nineteenth and early twentieth centuries in both cases.

Passports emerged in the era of the French Revolution and became substantially universal prior to the 1850s. Their function was to establish a state monopoly as against guilds and corporations in providing identity documents for travelers, and of course they eased the state's ability to distinguish between citizens and noncitizens. In the German *Vormärz*, states increased their surveillance of borders and highways and introduced the now-familiar systems of mandatory registration with local police in response to unemployment and to the spread of revolutionary agitation. Yet movement toward economic liberalism, such as the Zollverein and the introduction of *Gewerbefreiheit*, as well as the cost and practicability of surveilling borders and highways, by the 1850s created a new system whereby passports tended not to be examined upon entry, but were universally useful in fulfilling the obligation to register with local authorities and to prove one's identity to the police upon demand. Individual contexts of economic conjuncture and fiscal policies of the state led to widely varied policies and applications of policies at different places and times.

German legal systems on the surface were much more restrictive for resident aliens than the British systems. Again, practice proved different from theory, for propertied residents not only gained rights to domicile more easily in the German states but also found the way to naturalization easier than in Britain. Both places saw a differential application of laws to marginal groups, particularly itinerant peddlers but also other outsiders such as Jews, Catholics (especially in Britain), Irish, and paupers and vagrants. Fahrmeir finds the test often to be one of perception; Britain's more liberal system perceived aliens as primarily wealthy and thus contributing to the well-being of society. In Germany, they were often viewed as paupers and the cause of unemployment, and officials thus applied laws more harshly to aliens than to citizens, including forcible deportation (something far simpler and cheaper in Hesse than in Britain!). Still, civil law in German states provided widespread equality of rights for resident aliens and citizens in matters of inheritance, contract, and access to courts, again undercutting the received notion of relentless persecution of aliens in Germany.

Fahrmeir's lucid and valuable study thus establishes not only that German conceptions and systems of citizenship predate the victory of German nationalist (and nativist) thought, but also that, despite the greater liberality of the British system in most respects, the German regime had many attributes more liberal than the British. What changed after 1870, in Germany and elsewhere, was not the institutional or conceptual framework of citizenship, but the dominant legitimacy of the idea of nationalism. By virtue of his scrupulous and searching exploration of the "in-between" era in which citizenship regimes

emerged, Fahrmeir strikes a telling and persuasive blow for the "modernist" account of nationalism against the "primordialists."

KENNETH F. LEDFORD
CASE WESTERN RESERVE UNIVERSITY

Mutter ledig — Vater Staat: Das Gebär- und Findelhaus in Wien, 1784–1910. By Verena Pawlowsky. Innsbruck: Studien Verlag. 2001. Pp. 340. Eur 33.00. ISBN 3–7065–1548–2.

Verena Pawlowsky's new book, *Mutter ledig — Vater Staat*, on the birthing and foundling hospital in Vienna represents the very best in a social history of an institution. The author has skillfully combined a great amount of research on one of the more interesting of late eighteenth-century Austria's new social institutions. The book discusses in detail and with penetrating analysis the issue of children born out of wedlock in the Habsburg capital. How to handle illegitimate children was a major problem in a modernizing society. In Vienna, the situation was similar to that in many other European capitals: a special institution was established for the care of foundling children. And as in several other European cities, the Viennese hospital cared first for the mothers of illegitimate children and then for the children themselves. Indeed, with rare exception it was a condition for acceptance by the foundling hospital that a child's mother had delivered the child in the same institution. For this reason, the mothers were well known to the medical staff and thorough records on both mothers and children were created.

Pawlowsky uses these records effectively to give the reader several different and important historical contexts for understanding the phenomenon of illegitimacy and the fate of illegitimate children in Vienna. Thus, we learn much about the mothers through a discussion of their social standing, occupation, age, and religious affiliation. Regional background and migration patterns also figure into the profile of the mothers. Equally thorough is the author's treatment of the children's life inside and outside of the foundling institution. Pawlowsky has worked out the economics of the institution to a fine degree. In addition, she examines issues such as the spread of disease and immunization within the hospital and the care of children by wet-nurses outside of it. These are highly effective sections of the book, which continually place the story of illegitimate children, their mothers, and those who cared for both in several important and interlocking social and cultural contexts.

Pawlowsky also dedicates an entire chapter to a discussion of mortality rates and the causes of death of foundling children. This chapter is a good analysis of the very difficult social circumstances that characterized the lives of lower-class

people in Vienna and its surrounding territories. As Pawlowsky shows, both the mothers of these children and the wet-nurses who often took care of them came from underprivileged segments of Austrian society. The former were frequently domestics who had come to Vienna seeking work whereas the latter came primarily from the margins of Lower Austrian rural society — many of the foundling children were literally farmed out to women in the surrounding countryside. Finding themselves pregnant, women of meager means were dependent upon the foundling hospital for the delivery and care of their illegitimate children. The children's chances in life, therefore, were influenced by the social conditions of their mothers and their caretakers. It is not surprising that despite the improvements in medicine and hygiene in the late eighteenth and first half of the nineteenth centuries, foundling children succumbed to epidemic diseases such as cholera at an alarming rate and at a higher rate than was the norm for all Austrian or Viennese children. A child's chances for survival were further diminished if it was premature, underweight, or poorly nourished. A high percentage of the foundling children who died in Vienna did not even make it out of their first month of life. According to Pawlowsky, child mortality rates for foundlings and the Viennese population at large only improved significantly in the last decades of the nineteenth century (post-1873), when the dedicated alpine water supply (*Hochquellwasserleitung*) improved the city's health and hygiene considerably. Even after the 1870s, however, disease and death remained a threat to the foundling children. Indeed, the high mortality rates for most of the nineteenth century provide Pawlowsky with several sets of important documents for her study, namely, autopsy reports and burial certificates. As in almost all cases, she uses these materials to create vivid images of the social and economic position of foundlings within Austrian society.

The end of the foundling hospital in 1910 was the product of a long process in Vienna and reflected several key shifts in Austrian society. During the nineteenth century, there was a growing critique of the separation of mothers from their children, regardless of whether the children had been born illegitimately. A woman who gave up her child too readily could be accused of a lack of motherly love. Increasingly, the institution of a foundling hospital was criticized for making the separation of mothers and children too easy. At the same time, there was a growing awareness that the root concern with illegitimate births was poverty and not the supposed shame that came from a woman not being married. Public authorities and Austrian opinion-makers therefore focused more directly on the issue of poverty and less frequently upon the phenomenon of illegitimacy as such. By the early twentieth century, therefore, the birthing and foundling hospital had largely lost its rationale in the minds of many government officials and Austrian society in general. The hospital seemed to be a product of an earlier way of thinking and dealing with a complex social phenomenon. By 1910 it was an anachronism. Thus, when the foundling hospital

was closed and replaced by a new institution, the Lower Austrian Landes-Zentralkinderheim, the latter's central criterion for whether it would care for a child was not illegitimacy but poverty and destitution.

Pawlowsky has created a comprehensive and persuasive account of the birthing and foundling hospital in Vienna from its inception to its demise. In doing so, she has also provided a strong model for writing a social history of an institution. Hopefully, other scholars will follow her example so that our understanding of Viennese and Austrians institutions and their political and social contexts will continue to expand. This book is highly recommended to students and scholars of Central European history.

WILLIAM D. BOWMAN
GETTYSBURG COLLEGE

The Great Train Race: Railways and the Franco-German Rivalry, 1815–1914. By Allan Mitchell. New York: Berghahn Books. 2000. Pp. xv + 328. $69.95. ISBN 1–57181–166–4.

For good reason, the nineteenth century is often dubbed the "railway age." The impact of railways on state-building, finance, communication, urban development, political parties, military affairs, and on national, regional, and local economies is simply enormous, and often too great and varied to weave into one narrative. The subject's complexity usually leads historians of German railroads to tackle one German state, typically Prussia, Saxony, or Bavaria, as a representative sample of a larger unwieldy whole. For this reason, the breadth of Allan Mitchell's comparative study of French and German railroad development — the largest and most important railway systems on the continent — is a signal achievement. As the author of three previous studies on the influence of German social, military, and political thought on French society and politics, Allan Mitchell is well equipped to draw the larger significance of railroad building for Germany and France. By presenting the growth and development of two distinctively different railroad systems within a broad political and economic framework, Mitchell's work deserves considerable praise.

The work is divided into three chronological sections: early railroad building (1815–1870), a period of national consolidation (1870–1890), and an era of "internal and international tensions" (1890–1914). Within each of these sections, Mitchell handles France and Germany separately but weds the discrete discussions in concluding chapters that emphasize administrative differences, economic competition, and military strategy. The juxtapositional organization enables the author to explore the systems' peculiarities but also provides a basis for comparison. Both began as "mixed systems," whereby the state played a sub-

sidiary role in promoting and regulating private rail companies. And both the French Republic and the German Empire sought greater control of the rail system but never achieved full dominion. In Germany, the particular interests of German states and private railways successfully thwarted a fully coordinated imperial rail system, in spite of Bismarck's concerted efforts between 1866 and 1878 to bring railroads under the full purview of the Prussian-German Empire. Although the story of German railroad particularism is not new, Mitchell's attention to the political economies and negotiating skills of Württemberg, Bavaria, and Saxony provides a refreshing new perspective for a decidedly Prussocentric historiography. In France, large and politically well-connected private railroad companies acted as a centripetal force to the centralizing impulse of French statist policy, thus becoming by 1870 "the true champions of federalism and liberalism in France" (p. 73). Even though the grand Freycinet Plan of the late 1870s strove to enlarge state influence in rail affairs with massive state subventions and stricter regulation, the French government abandoned the new course by 1882, thus acknowledging the continued power of private enterprise and liberal principles in the French Republic. By 1890, Mitchell characterizes the systems' organizational frameworks as set, enabling him to show the central role of railroad construction and administration in international politics, military strategy, and economic growth. All three sections underscore how national political contexts played a significant role in determining the application of technology, the coordination of military needs, and the promotion of economic growth.

A brief sketch of the book's trajectory does justice neither to the wealth of detail nor to the arresting insights that future historians will draw on for years to come. Yet some qualifications must temper this praise. First, the theme of the "great railway race" loses its steam over the course of the book; what might have been a shrewd political portrait of the times, depicted with newspaper articles, ministry reports, and parliamentary speeches, turns out to be a dry structural argument. One can also question some of Mitchell's premises. He posits, for example, the "primary fact that the principles of ownership were divergent" (p. 251), thus contrasting French liberal traditions to Germany's growing state bureaucratization of public life. But there is another way to tell the story: German private railway companies profited handsomely from the "mixed system" until the late 1870s; they invoked principles of laissez-faire individualism to a supportive public to fend off rapacious states seeking ownership; and they only surrendered the industry after 1879 when it ceased to be the most profitable leading sector. Seen in this light, the role of money markets as well as the fractious assertiveness of bourgeois entrepreneurs offer more similarities with France's liberalism than differences. But the chief criticism of this book is its vague historiographical aims. Straddling economic and political history, this study falls between two stools. In economic history, Mitchell presents an array

of economic data, but the reader struggles to determine the analytical importance of such points and how they modify not only the paradigms of France's etatism and Germany's economic decentralization but also the well-established historiographies on business organization, national economic growth, and government-business relations. In political history, too, it is not always manifest how the intrinsically compelling story of rival railroad systems confirms, revises, or otherwise advances scholarship on state-building, national political cultures, the politics of the business class, or the current discussions on nineteenth-century civil and industrial societies. In sum, the prodigious scholarship is clearly evident, but the author needed a firmer hand in pointing out the significance of the evidence marshalled.

Scholars of European history will find much to mine from this solid study. Mitchell has written an impressive comparative study that will aid future scholarship on interpreting the intersection of railroads and politics in European society. In conjunction with Volker Then's and Colleen Dunlavy's recent comparative histories of railroad building, this study adds to an important new body of literature in economic history.

JAMES M. BROPHY
UNIVERSITY OF DELAWARE

"Wehr Dich!" Der Centralverein deutscher Staatsbürger jüdischen Glaubens (C.V.) 1893–1938. By Avraham Barkai. Munich: C.H. Beck. 2002. Pp. 496. EUR 44.90. ISBN 3–406–49522–2.

This is an important book on an important subject for two reasons. It is the first comprehensive account of the 45–year history of the main representative body of the Jews of Germany, bringing together existing monographs on individual aspects of its activities as well as unpublished material. Even more significantly, it is a beneficiary of the end of the Cold War. The records of the Centralverein deutscher Staatsbürger jüdischen Glaubens (C.V.), especially those for the final years of the Weimar Republic and the first years of the Third Reich, were long considered lost, having been confiscated by the Gestapo when the C.V. was wound up. In 1990 it emerged that large parts of it — over four thousand items — had been taken over by the Soviet authorities at the end of the war and lodged in the special archive that contained a great many other long-lost treasures. Even then the record was not complete, since the C.V. had been careful to shred the accounts of its most sensitive activities, including its relations with the political parties of the republic, conducted by its Wilhelmstrasse office, and its finances. Avraham Barkai has spelled out the details of what the archive

does and does not contain in two articles, in the *Tel-Aviver Jahrbuch für deutsche Geschichte* 23 (1994) and the *Year Book of the Leo Baeck Institute* 45 (2000) and does not repeat this information here. It is, however, notable that as we move into the later years covered by the narrative, the material becomes less familiar and the footnote references to the special archive more frequent.

Barkai's original intention was to cover only the crisis years of the C.V.'s last decade, but it soon became evident that since so much of the intellectual energies of this period were devoted to ideological disputes — with Zionists on the one hand and the ultra-German nationalist followers of Max Naumann on the other — these disputes would make sense only in the context of the whole German-Jewish political debate since the foundation of the C.V. It is clear from Barkai's account that German-Jewish politics was not only about the defense of civil rights and combating anti-Semitism, but about identity, indeed at times more about identity than any other issue. The reason for that lay in the wider German political environment and the insecurity of a general German national identity, which led one of the most prominent German-Jewish scholars, Leo Baeck, to denounce the worship of "Germandom" as a substitute religion. At all times the leaders of the C.V. and its more active grassroots members insisted on wearing their German-national hearts on their sleeves, in part out of political calculation, but also because this corresponded with their genuine conviction. As late as 1928, after the traumas of the First World War and the often violent anti-Semitism of the postwar years, the C.V. once more committed itself to "the complete harmony between Germandom and Jewishness." The challenge of Zionism, which proclaimed the thesis of a separate Jewish people, helped to provoke these apologetic responses, which continued even after 1933, when the two wings were obliged to cooperate, often quite effectively, to salvage what remained of the German-Jewish existence.

Barkai, who on his own admission used to share many of the Zionist prejudices against the liberal "assimilationists" of the C.V., treats these never-ending debates nonjudgmentally, quoting widely not only from the insiders and their opponents, but from eminent sympathetic outsiders, such as the neo-Kantian philosopher Hermann Cohen. Some readers, wanting a straightforward narrative of the C.V. as a political actor and a rather oligarchic middle-class pressure group, may feel tempted to skip these sometimes rather repetitive controversies. Barkai would answer that they are essential to an understanding of his interpretation of the C.V., of its development from an association to a movement and its transformation from a defense organization to an ideologically-defined community, as it sought to expand its appeal to the Orthodox, to white-collar workers, and to the second and third generations of formally emancipated youth. Significantly he concludes that, far from selling out the Jewish birthright by its pursuit of conspicuous German patriotism, it played a major role in pre-

serving a Jewish identity for an otherwise rather secularized and acculturated constituency.

PETER PULZER
ALL SOULS COLLEGE, OXFORD

Rudolf Virchow: Mediziner — Anthropologe — Politiker. By Constantin Goschler. Cologne: Böhlau Verlag. 2002. Pp. 556. EUR 39.90. ISBN 3–412–09102–2.

Intellectual trends have made historical biography increasingly problematic. After historical social science devalued the agency of an individual subject in comparison to determining social structures, postmodernism deconstructed the individual as unitary personality, leaving the biographer with, literally and figuratively, no subject. Yet public interest in biography remains considerable and the genre has enjoyed a revival in recent years. What has emerged, though, is no longer the linear, unified life story of a distinct individual. Both Lothar Gall's biography of Bismarck and Ian Kershaw's of Hitler, to take two prominent examples, involved the authors measuring their subjects against social and political developments of their eras. As an example perhaps closer to the book under consideration here, Friedrich Lenger, in his recent biography of Werner Sombart, speculated on how different Sombart's place in history would have been had his life ended at a different date.

Constantin Goschler, in his biography of Rudolf Virchow, takes a different tack, using various aspects of his subject's life to explore questions about and controversies in nineteenth-century history. Virchow's academic career, for instance, becomes a way for the author to evaluate the causes of the expansion of German universities in the nineteenth century, and to examine the social and economic standing of the German professoriate. Goschler discusses Virchow's private life to explore the relationship between the private and the public in the nineteenth century, the role of property in the life of the *Bürgertum*, and the nature of gender relations among the educated middle class. Virchow's political career offers the possibility of considering the long-term political trajectory of 1848 democrats, the transition from notables' politics to mass politics, or the role of scientific and technocratic expertise in German politics.

Perhaps the single most concentrated set of questions the author poses concerns Virchow's intellectual development. It is not Virchow as scientist, his place in nineteenth-century biology and medical science, that is the primary focus of Goschler's interests; rather he concentrates on Virchow as scientific popularizer and as what we would today call a public intellectual. The author employs

Virchow's ideas to consider the relationship between an increasingly self-confident empirical and experimental natural science and the neohumanist ideal of *Bildung*, the changing concepts of progress, the application of biological metaphors to state and society, and the articulation and use of concepts of race in their relationship to ideas of citizenship and of the nation.

Goschler draws the questions he poses from a wide variety of secondary sources, showing an impressive grasp of historical scholarship in Europe and North America. With this approach, though, the idea of biography as the consecutive narration of an individual's life history largely disappears, reduced to the author's assertion that the revolution of 1848 and its failure marked a point of discontinuity in Virchow's understanding of the relationship between private and public and between scholarship and politics. Instead, the book offers a thematic consideration of different aspects of Virchow's life, each with its own distinct chronology and internal structure. Yet Goschler's method, while rejecting the narrative unity of an individual subject's life, ends up reintroducing this unity in two different ways.

First, the author's strategy of using an individual's life to explore a wide range of historical questions works very well because the subject of his investigations engaged in an astonishing range of activities. Physician, biologist, anthropologist, professor, journal editor, political activist, deputy in the Berlin City Council, the Prussian Landtag and the Reichstag, consultant and governmental advisor, public lecturer, textbook author, journalist and commentator, dutiful son, devoted husband and father — and all these activities producing extensive documentation which the author uses to good effect — it is precisely the unity of all these activities in one person's life that makes possible a biography posing so many questions about nineteenth-century history. Goschler does discuss this multiplicity of activities, although primarily in terms of exploring how Virchow found the time for all of them.

Perhaps more importantly, though, the unity of the subject's life in this work is replaced by the unity of the questions the author poses. The central point of the book is the contemporary questioning and deconstruction of the positivist, empiricist, and progress-oriented view of natural science, as can be seen in Goschler's frequent evocations of the French sociologist Bruno Latour. Here, the darker side, one might say, of Rudolf Virchow becomes apparent. His meteoric academic career appears less as a result of outstanding scientific research than of the manipulation of the process of disciplinary specialization. Virchow used his understanding of biology to justify a polarized gender order in which women were destined for home and family. Virchow's application of scientific knowledge to public policy, as in his advocacy of a central Berlin slaughterhouse to eliminate the dangers of trichinosis, hid the opposing social and economic interests involved in policy decisions. His apotheosis of empirical science and of

progress involved an intolerant rejection of pluralist understandings of politics and society, as can be seen in his promotion of the *Kulturkampf* or in his hostility to the emerging socialist labor movement.

Goschler does tend to reject the charge that Virchow's sponsorship of a racial-anthropological investigation of German schoolchildren in the 1870s fostered anti-Semitic racism. He explores in interesting detail the differences between Virchow's understanding of race and its relation to nationality and those of social Darwinist and fascist thinkers. In this respect, as in many others, the author presents Virchow's opinions on science, philosophy, politics, and society as shaped by events of the mid-nineteenth century and increasingly outdated by the century's end.

Goschler's *Rudolf Virchow* is an intriguing and challenging work. One may wonder about the validity of the critique of natural science that the author employs as a central framework for his investigations, and, at times, his conclusions on the Berlin slaughterhouse controversy, for instance, can seem a little strained. Nonetheless, the book is a testimony to the possibilities of writing an empirically well-documented biography following the problematization of historical subjects, their relationship to their social and political environment, and their linear life-course. Of course, the approach is so successful in this case in part because the author has studied an extraordinary individual and his remarkable life-course.

JONATHAN SPERBER
UNIVERSITY OF MISSOURI

Berlin, Kabul, Moskau: Oskar Ritter von Niedermayer und Deutschlands Geopolitik. By Hans-Ulrich Seidt. Munich: Universitas. Pp. 510. EUR 24.80. ISBN 3–8004–1438–4.

Oskar Niedermayer had an unusual and varied career in the service of causes, all of which, sooner or later, were lost. Born into an educated middle-class Bavarian family — his knighthood came later — he was commissioned a lieutenant in the artillery in 1905. Soon he also began to study geology, geography, and Islamic languages at the University of Erlangen. The new discipline of geopolitics attracted him, but he retained an independent, critical view of its not infrequent tendency to convert geographic realities into political absolutes. Between 1912 and 1914 he was given leave to travel in Iran. This experience led to his appointment at the beginning of the First World War to an expedition to Afghanistan, sent out to foment insurrection against the British rule in India. Other than concluding a treaty of friendship with Afghanistan, the enterprise achieved little. Niedermayer then served with the Turkish forces until he was

recalled to Germany in May of 1918 to plan a new operation in the Caucasus.

After Germany's defeat, Niedermayer entered the new Reichswehr, for a time as adjutant to General von Seeckt, who sent him to Russia to promote the Reich's secret military cooperation with the Soviets. Between 1924 and 1931, Niedermayer served as second in command and then as head of the "Zentrale Moskau," retired from the army, and turned to an academic career. In 1933 he was appointed *Privatdozent* at the University of Berlin in the new field of *Wehrgeografie* and *Wehrpolitik*. He both welcomed the Third Reich and disagreed with some of its positions. He did not regard Slavs and Afghans as racially inferior, valued individual Jews, but identified the Jewish race as Germany's international enemy. In the fall of 1933, he joined the party. Nevertheless, he continued to speak positively of the Soviet Union, in his view Germany's natural ally against the British Empire — an attitude that attracted the Gestapo's attention, but did not block his advancement to *Ordinarius.*

When the Second World War began, he became assistant head of the German military mission to Iraq. In 1942 he was promoted to major general and appointed commanding officer of a new division made up of Russian prisoners of war, who were members of non-Russian ethnic minorities. The division carried out police actions against partisans in the Ukraine and Slovakia, after which it was sent to Italy where Niedermayer, who had never gone through standard training for senior officers, was found inadequate for his position and was transferred to command Russian and East European volunteer units in France. Late in 1944 he was denounced by a fellow officer for saying that, regardless of communism, Germany and Russia should be allies. He was in prison awaiting trial when the Third Reich collapsed, and he was freed. Instead of making himself inconspicuous, Niedermayer seems to have walked into a Russian headquarters, presumably counting on the important contacts he had made in Moskau in the 1920s. He was rearrested and taken to Moskau, where he died in 1948.

What might have been no more than a picaresque tale has been turned by Hans-Ulrich Seidt into an excellent biography, distinguished by wide-ranging research and a firm understanding of the shifting political and military context. Niedermayer was the sort of man whom historians value less for what he achieved than what his life touched, and the nuances of past conditions and attitudes he conveys to us. His career included a number of unusual episodes, but even these are interesting above all for the social, intellectual, and political features characteristic of their time and place. Until the last years of his life, Niedermayer was a member of a compact majority, but sometimes out of step with it — a contrast that throws much light on his environment. Seidt's biography, an instructive cross section through half a century of German history, does not ask general questions, let alone develop theories of social and political behavior, but it offers the facts and attitudes that such hypotheses must confront

and in the end explain. His book raises any number of issues that go beyond the immediate subject: two, which define much of Neidermayer's life, are attractions in both world wars of strategies to defeat a continental enemy by striking at his southeastern flank, an indirect approach that has always been difficult to implement; and the moral adjustments that a *Bildungsbürger* felt driven to make in the Third Reich.

PETER PARET
INSTITUTE FOR ADVANCED STUDY

Diktaturen im Vergleich. By Detlef Schmiechen-Ackermann. Darmstadt: Wissenschaftliche Buchgesellschaft. 2002. Pp. viii + 174. EUR 16.50. ISBN 3–534–14730–8.

This book, part of the series *Kontroversen um die Geschichte* and accurately described in its title as a comparative study of dictatorships, is essentially a biographical essay on the central themes the author has chosen to discuss. It deals almost exclusively with Europe, with emphasis on the Soviet, German, and Italian experiences. China, Chile, and indeed all non-European dictatorships are mentioned only as asides.

An introductory section describes the rise of "modern" dictatorships (which the author regards as the "*signum*" of the twentieth century), and includes a survey of the techniques of dictatorial rule from ancient times to the present. A second section is a detailed discussion of the methodology of comparative history, its problems and limitations. In this connection he presents his rationale for his choice of themes. These include an "integral comparison" of twentieth-century dictatorships, of communism and Stalinism, Italian fascism, and Nazism. He goes on to compare the leadership qualities of Stalin, Hitler, and Mussolini, their political parties and government machinery. There follows a comparison of the social and economic background of these dictatorial regimes, the intellectual life and language of dictatorship, and the role of women in fascist Italy and Nazi Germany.

Of particular interest is the author's review of literature dealing with the criminal record of the dictatorships under discussion, a comparative analysis of their secret police and networks of informers, their use of terror and repression, and their mass slaughter of people under their rule. On this subject he clearly sides with scholars who reject the equation of Nazi and Communist crimes — Nazi genocide and the Communist mass murder of social/economic classes. However horrendous the crimes of communism were, there never was a Red Holocaust (p. 122). He also sides with critics of the theory, advanced by some scholars, that Italian fascism, unlike Nazism, was never racial nor anti-Semitic.

To counter this theory, he cites works dealing with fascist claims to racial superiority, its denigration of Slavs and Africans, as well as its outright anti-Semitism. He concludes that Mussolini and his henchmen were fully aware of the consequences of their anti-Semitic legislation and had laid the basis for a "Final Solution" in Italy (pp. 123–24). In his chapter on popular opposition and resistance, the author dismisses scholarly claims that there was a German popular resistance movement, and observes that the idea of a *Volk der Widerständler* would have been described more accurately as a *Widerstand ohne Volk* (p. 134).

In his final chapter the author restates at some length his reason for adopting a comparative approach to problems of dictatorship and concludes that aspirations to dictatorship will always be with us in one form or another. Because of this ever-present danger, he contends that the study of the past and the present mutations of democracy and dictatorship remains a task of superior political and historical importance (pp. 147–51).

NORMAN RICH
BROWN UNIVERSITY

Die völkische Bewegung im wilhelminischen Kaiserreich: Sprache — Rasse — Religion. By Uwe Puschner. Darmstadt: Wissenschaftliche Buchgesellschaft. 2001. Pp. 464. EUR 65.00. ISBN 3–534–15052–X.

Although many scholars working on the intellectual origins of National Socialism have shown a keen interest in *völkische* ideology, and several have gone to pains to trace its origins back to Imperial Germany, there has been little effort to study the array of *völkisch* movements that took shape during the Kaiserreich. These movements turned around a variety of agendas: religious rebirth, economic growth, racial and linguistic purity, anti-Semitism, anti-Slavism, eugenics, internal colonialism, and even diet and health. Many and varied, these movements lacked both an overarching organization and consistent ideology, but they persisted in sundry forms into the Weimar Republic and, according to Uwe Puschner, they prepared much of the ground for radical right-wing nationalism and National Socialism.

Well-documented, nicely illustrated, and exhaustively researched, Puschner offers his readers an overwhelming amount of detail about the seemingly countless associations in the Kaiserreich that championed an idea of the German *Volk*. He contends that, taken together, these associations constituted an important *völkische Bewegung*, one that has been overlooked by scholars such as George Mosse, who privileged the role of "thinkers" while trying to understand the ways in which older notions of the German *Volk* helped to shape National

Socialism. Puschner does a fine job in bringing these many associations to life, illustrating their heterogeneity, underscoring the competing and often contradictory motivations that shaped them, and introducing some of their more colorful members to his readers. In some ways, his book offers a nice addition to the arguments Mosse and others offered long ago, but the organization and presentation of the material leaves much to be desired.

Puschner's book is divided into chapters devoted to language, race, and religion, followed by a shorter final chapter focused on unsuccessful efforts to create either an overarching organizational structure or a political party that would represent the varied interests of the many individuals and associations in his book. Roger Chickering made the connection between associations promoting the German language and nationalist movements quite clear many years ago, and Puschner seeks to build on this insight by illustrating the range of associations that were engaged in promoting linguistic purity. Within these associations, the rhetoric of race was not initially linked to biology and the adjective *völkisch* was not tied to anti-Semitism; but these connections grew as efforts to preserve the language became wrapped in the rhetoric of survival and championed by more radical nationalists. In this sense, associations devoted to promoting the purity of the German language provided some of the key impulses to a more general *völkisch* worldview, and they continue to provide historians with a means for tracing out the ways in which that worldview shifted and changed as the century drew to a close.

Puschner offers similar insights into the associations devoted to religion and race. Efforts to define a German religion ranged widely from groups interested in embracing particular forms of Christianity to various kinds of paganism. But they shared a desire to distance Germans from Rome and, increasingly, a tendency to define Germans, Germanness, and German religion with an apocalyptic, antiegalitarian, and highly racialized language. Indeed, despite the tripartite structure of the volume, race and racists receive the majority of the author's attention. The section on race is by far the longest, including discussions of anti-Semitism, Gobineau associations, the yellow threat, the *Schutzvereine*, eugenics movements, *Heimat* movements, proposals to build garden cities, body cults, arguments about the need for *Lebensraum*, and much more. But here, as in the other sections, Puschner's exposition often overwhelms his analysis as his lists of names and associations become unwieldy.

Unfortunately, his central chapter headings — language, race, and religion — function more as rubrics than guiding concepts. Under each we find a cacophony of individuals, associations, magazines, and journals promoting notions of a German *Volk*, but their importance seems to lie in their mere existence, and documenting that existence remains his primary contribution. Without a clear analytical framework, however, the many details about the *völkische Bewegung(en)* that emerge in his story fail to do more than confirm much of what we already

know about the contentious roles language, race, and religion played in nationalist associations around the turn of the century. And, despite introducing us to a range of relatively unknown actors in the Kaiserreich, it does little to help us better understand the character of Imperial Germany which, this reviewer suspects, was articulated more through the inconsistencies in these movements, their lack of an overarching ideology and organization, and their many failures, than through their consistencies and their links to similar movements decades later. Scholars seeking information about *völkische* associations or the people who created them will find much in this volume of interest. Those seeking insights into either the links between National Socialism and the Wilhelmian era or the character of Imperial Germany, however, will find little that is new.

H. GLENN PENNY
UNIVERSITY OF IOWA

Eros and Inwardness in Vienna: Weininger, Musil, Doderer. By David Luft. Chicago: University of Chicago Press. 2003. Pp. xiv + 257. $35.00. ISBN 0–226–49647–3.

Reviewing David Luft's fine *Robert Musil and the Crisis of European Culture* when it appeared in 1980, I remarked that it was a pity that Luft had not explored the connections between Musil's thought and Otto Weininger's bizarre, but highly influential, views about female sexuality and the demand for sexual continence on the part of men. With this new book, David Luft endeavors to fill that gap adding Heimito von Doderer in the framework of a discussion of the conflict between two ideologies, scientific materialism and philosophical irrationalism, to form a picture of how eroticism emerged as a central theme in Viennese thought from the fin de siècle to the early days of the Second Republic. Luft thus continues one important strain in the work of Carl Schorske, whose analysis of the previous generation is presupposed. His provocative thesis about Viennese eroticism is: "Weininger recoiled from the dominance of the natural sciences in the intellectual world of liberal Vienna, Musil embraced it, and Doderer tried to find a way beyond it" (p. 28). Not unsurprisingly, then, Musil turns out to be the central figure in the study, which in fact revolves around the question of what becomes of ethics after Nietzsche. Luft takes this question to be one that was forced upon the alienated generation that grew to maturity after 1900, whose experiences were formed by the Russian Revolution, the disastrous introduction of universal suffrage in the western half of the monarchy, and the virtually total polarization between Christian Socials and Social Democrats that had developed by then. Weininger's, Musil's, and Doderer's views about the meaning of the profound tension between sexuality and the

demands of rationality are thus depicted against the backdrop of these intellectual and political dynamics with a view to appreciating the intellectual struggles and strategies that we find in *Geschlecht und Charaker*, *Der Mann ohne Eigenschaften*, and *Die Dämonen* respectively.

This is not light fare and, despite the encomia of a number of prominent historians on the dust jacket, Luft only partially succeeds in satisfying the interdisciplinary demands that his subject imposes upon him. Musil, understandably in a work by a leading authority, receives the best treatment. His *chef d'oeuvre, Der Mann ohne Eigenschaften*, Luft reminds us, is an inquiry into the nature of love and no mere satire on "Kakania." Already in essays in the 1920s like "The German Personality as Symptom," the fascination with the irreducible polarity between "precision" and "soul" that is so central to *Der Mann ohne Eigenschaften* is clearly present. Luft rightly argues that Musil's greatness attaches to his refusal to play off reason against emotion or vice versa, but instead to describe their monumental struggle to coexist in his characters in all its intensity. Like Jean-Pierre Cometti in *Robert Musil ou l'alternative romanesque*, Luft believes that Musil ended up very close to Wittgenstein's view that the most important things in life cannot be put into scientific theories but must be written as fiction.

There is much food for thought with respect to what is typically Austrian since the Second World War in Luft's presentation of Doderer. In his oeuvre, which is clearly developed in reaction to both Weininger and Musil, Doderer represents the irrational as a neurotic fixation upon one's own sexuality that resembles totalitarian ideology inasmuch as it entails a flight into unreality. Reality, on the other hand, is contrasted with apperception, which is reflective self-observation, in effect, a kind of transcendental voyeurism. In this situation sexuality comes to assume a spiritual significance as an object of self-reflection. At the same time such a conception of reflection becomes the basis for a conservative critique of ideology. In effect, it is the old Nazi-become-Catholic's strategy for coping with a world in which he has become a victim of his own solipsistic psychic urges. Unconditional apperception with the minimum of preconceptions, in effect accepting a kind of "feminine" sexuality à la Weininger in oneself, is the way to come to grips with the irrational in the world. If such stoicism is really typical of the Second Republic, as Luft suggests, *Eros and Inwardness in Vienna* should open up a wider discussion of issues about culture and society in the Second Republic.

The treatment of Weininger's moral critique of a sex-ridden society is less successful in part because Luft does not seem to be aware of important literature such as Waltraud Hirsch's *Eine unbescheidene Charakterologie* with its critical overview of Weininger's texts and extensive documentation, or Habib Malik's definitive *Receiving Søren Kierkegaard*. In many cases Luft treats tensions in Weininger's thought as though they were full-blown contradictions, often from

an inability to follow Weininger's abstruse argumentation. However, Luft continually resists succumbing to the myriad clichés surrounding Weininger and urges his reader to do likewise while providing a largely reliable guide to Weininger's "genderizing" of everything relating to "modernity." What Luft does not do is to ask what it was about Viennese society and above all *die Wiener Moderne*, that prompted Weininger to do that. This is unfortunate; for Weininger's answer to that question is closer to Carl Schorske's than many people might believe.

Further, overestimating some of Weininger's remarks about the inadequacy of science to represent the problem of the relationship between the sexes adequately, Luft fails to investigate the role of science in Weininger's enterprise as a whole — for a book that purports to concern the conflict between scientific materialism and philosophical irrationalism there is virtually no history of science in the book at all. What is scientific in Musil's acceptance of Mach? There is much to be said for the case that scientific materialism is much more an ideology of science, like monism, than truly representative of it. Moreover, developments in the history and philosophy of science since Michael Polanyi, who emphasized the role of feeling in scientific understanding, and Thomas Kuhn and Co., who have thoroughly revamped our notion of scientific rationality, are at least deserving of mention in a study of this nature. Be that as it may, Weininger's main contention is not that science is wrong about the nature of eroticism but that it cannot answer the deepest questions about it adequately. Thus science has to be complemented by literature and philosophy à la Goethe.

Luft is sometimes vague with respect to the clarification of important terminology. For example, Doderer's crucial notion of "apperception" is elusive as is the author's account of the role of the Thomistic *analogia entis* in his thinking. The alleged connections between these figures are not particularly well documented. In addition the footnotes do not always seem to support what they should. Finally, the tension between scientific materialism and philosophical irrationalism from which Luft proceeds has a way of disappearing without trace by the time he gets to Doderer.

In the end the reader has the sense of a lively encounter with interesting and important ideas in need of further documentation and wider articulation, especially with respect to their social context. Doubtless the style and substance of Luft's *Eros and Inwardness in Vienna* insures that it will be read, but it should be read with a critical eye. It is a welcome contribution to understanding Viennese culture and what became of it.

ALLAN JANIK
THE BRENNER ARCHIVES RESEARCH INSTITUTE,
UNIVERSITY OF INNSBRUCK

The Survival of Images: Art Historians, Psychoanalysis, and the Ancients. By Louis Rose. Detroit: Wayne State University Press. 2001. Pp. 209. $34.95. ISBN 0–8143–2860–1.

This monograph explores the emergence of a psychoanalytically oriented art history, one concerned with tracing motifs found in Western art to myth and to the psychic tensions of prehistoric clan life. The principal subjects are: the art historian Aby Warburg, his successor as director of the Warburg Library Fritz Saxl, the classicist Emanuel Loewy, the art historian-turned-psychoanalyst Ernst Kris, and Sigmund Freud. Born into the cultivated Jewish middle class in Central Europe before the First World War, they shared many personal connections. Saxl took over the direction of the Warburg Library when its founder was hospitalized for a mental breakdown in the 1920s and helped arrange for its safe transfer to London after the Nazi seizure of power. Freud and Loewy, only a year apart in age, grew up together in Vienna and were lifelong friends. Kris first became an art historian and then a psychoanalyst in Vienna where Freud named him as one of the editors of the *Imago*, the journal of the psychoanalytic movement. His work on the psychology and history of art also brought him in contact with the Warburg Library. Even Warburg, who explicitly rejected Freud's theories, was led by his investigation into the ritual bases of Renaissance art into some of the same terrain that Freud explored in his essays on art and especially in *Totem and Taboo*. There were of course many important differences in approach and subject matter between these men, but all of them found themselves at one point drawn into questions of image-making and the way in which images hearken back to classical antiquity: to its myths, to its dramaturgy, and to the primitive rituals and clan life that underlay them.

Rose begins with an explanation of how Warburg became interested in the problem of expressive gestures in Renaissance paintings and sculpture. Such gestures, which Warburg came to call "pathos formulas," acquired ultimately their emotional resonance because they represented residual bits of ancient dramaturgy, theater that represented deep-seated and timeless emotional conflicts. This conclusion led Warburg from the study of Renaissance painting to the study of primitive myths. Traveling in the 1890s to New Mexico and Arizona he witnessed the Pueblo *Hemis Kachina* ceremonies where dancers wearing masks recreated the presence of absent spirits. These rituals employed magic to "bind" hostile natural forces by having the dancers mimic them. But there was, according to Warburg, a latent tension in such rituals between the promise of mastery over hostile forces and the danger of becoming so immersed in the ritual identification that one would lose one's own sense of identity. Gradually, as a way of easing this tension, symbolical identifications replaced identification based on gesture and movement. Symbolism represented then a sublimation of pagan rituals, and thus the visual arts that employ symbols still recalled, albeit at

a considerable distance, the magic, rituals, and psychic tensions of primitive clan life. Warburg considered symbolism or image-making an evolutionary stage on the path to rationalism and the formulation of laws, but also believed that our memory preserved traces of the still powerful projections of the primitive ego.

Obviously this view has a striking affinity with the contemporary investigations of Freud into cultural phenomena. From the very beginning dream work can be read as a theater, one in which fragmentary gestures acquire their emotional resonance by recalling dramatic incidents and memory traces. Through such dramaturgical techniques as condensation and displacement dream symbols emerge in a process analogous to what Warburg described for the beginnings of civilization. Like Warburg, Freud saw art as a window into the human psyche and his prewar essays on artists and all who explore the ways in which art allows for repressed memories, which threaten the stability of the ego, to resurface symbolically, permitting them to be pacified or mastered. They all illustrate the principle that Freud considered central to mental and cultural life: "the instrument of repression . . . becomes the vehicle for the return" (quoted on p. 94). The culmination of these investigations is *Totem and Taboo* where the totemic festivals and the religions, including Christianity, which emerged from them are explained as elaborate theatrical events meant to evoke and honor the presence of the absent father. Just as the image of the serpent among the Pueblos, once a feared and ambiguous symbol, became etherealized over generations, so too the image of the hated and feared patriarch transforms itself into an idealized deity.

The psychological roots of image-making also fascinated Freud's friend, the classicist Emanuel Loewy, who in his book, *The Rendering of Nature in Early Greek Art*, asked how the Greeks were able to achieve a realist style. Not simply, he argued, by paying closer attention to their external world, or by learning a new technique, but rather by "a psychological process of recollection" (p. 66). Artists within a culture worked from a collection of "memory-pictures," a store of images that is gradually increased and enriched over time. The breakthrough to realism was indeed aided by a closer observation of nature, but it also was inspired by the work of Greek poets and dramatists who taught visual artists how to give their work a sense of movement by placing them in a dramatic scene. But beneath the new realism lurks still the archaic "memory-pictures." Similar themes are sounded by Ernst Kris, first in his study of the heroic image of the artist, which traced this potent myth back to ritualist magic, and then in his later study of caricature, which worked, he asserted, by mobilizing energies associated with the primitive magic and image-making as magic. Finally Fritz Saxl also explored the psychological reasons for the uses of the classical inheritance in painters from Holbein to Cézanne.

Rose has clearly identified an important and intriguing bundle of ideas within the modern development of what he calls cultural sciences. One need

only think of the debt that Ernst Gombrich, arguably the greatest art historian of the twentieth century and a strong presence in this book, owed to Warburg, Kris, Loewy, and Saxl, to understand how fruitful this form of psychological investigation could be in the arts. A patient reader with a solid background in the field should find some useful hints and ideas here. But the book suffers from two serious flaws. First, it lacks a wider context. What led these five individuals from very similar backgrounds to speculate about a residual, archaic past lurking beneath the images of Western art? Was there something in their shared background that might have predisposed them to this approach? To what situation and influences in the discipline of art history were they reacting? What was their enduring influence both within art history and in neighboring disciplines? Rose does draw parallels with the Cambridge classicists, including Jane Harrison, Gilbert Murray, and Francis Cornford, who focused on ritual as the source of Greek art, but one only has to read the beginning chapters of Gombrich's intellectual biography of Warburg to understand how useful a wider context would have been, even in a monograph.

A bigger, if related problem, however, has to do with the author's exposition of his subjects' ideas. It just is not very clear. One must read and reread passages just to understand various *Problemstellungen* and why they mattered. The problem is not so much with jargon, but rather that the author tries to compress too much that needs to be unpacked, explained, elucidated into his paragraphs. His abstract, and occasionally portentous sentences frequently cannot perform the tasks he assigns to them. The reader longs for examples and for arguments to support the, sometimes breathtaking, leaps from cause to effect. Too often, as for example in the discussion of Kris's ideas about caricature, one can only vaguely discern the argument as if it lay beneath a rather gauzy fabric. It is not a good sign when an excerpt from one of his subject's works explains far more clearly what is at stake then the previous four or five pages of the author's exposition. This reviewer turned frequently back to Gombrich, with pleasure and relief, to be able to follow the train of thought.

Even if one could wish, however, for a clearer, more contextualized discussion of the subject, one comes away from this book persuaded of its interest and wanting to know more. That is not a small accomplishment.

LAIRD M. EASTON
CALIFORNIA STATE UNIVERSITY, CHICO

Grossbürger und Unternehmer: Die deutsche Wirtschaftselite im 20. Jahrhundert. Edited by Dieter Ziegler. Göttingen: Vandenhoeck & Ruprecht. 2000. Pp. 282. EUR 39.00. ISBN 3–525–35682–X.

This edited collection, which originated in a series of conference papers, combines eleven essays by mostly younger historians, sociologists, and economists that summarize recent research on the German business, financial, and industrial elite. As Dieter Ziegler emphasizes in his informative introduction, the German *Wirtschaftsbürgertum* of the late nineteenth century — entrepreneurs, bankers, industrialists, and managers of large enterprises — were more clearly set apart from the aristocracy than its counterparts in other European countries. The once neat delineation between *Wirtschafts-* and *Bildungsbürgertum*, on the other hand, became blurred in the wake of increasing professionalization and the growing importance of a university education as a precondition for leadership positions in commerce, industry, and finance.

As might be expected with any work on twentieth-century Germany, the issue of continuity of elites is a central theme with several authors. Michael Hartmann, Dieter Ziegler, and Hervé Joly stress the relative stability in the composition of the German economic elite over time. The political upheavals of 1918, 1933, and 1945 did not, as one might think, result in a circulation of elites: the social characteristics of the group — social background, education, and adherence to *bürgerliche* values — remained largely unaltered. The greatest break took place after 1933 with the gradual elimination of members of the German-Jewish economic elite, many of whom were board members in Germany's larger banks or owners of private banking houses. With their demise, the "dynastic" character of the elite also began to change as family enterprises started to decline in overall importance, though this was a gradual process. As late as 1967, more than a third of Germany's three hundred largest firms remained family owned.

For the economic elite, the caesura of 1945, for all intents and purposes the most decisive rupture in twentieth-century German history, pales in comparison. A Nazi past rarely meant the end of one's career and even members of the younger generation, whose pro-Nazi sympathies had been stronger than those of the older generation, were allowed, after a period of denazification, to return to leadership positions in the 1950s. The economic elite of the 1950s is thus characterized by an astonishing degree of continuity with the 1930s and 1940s. Relative to other groups in society, qualification and proficiency standards had remained decisive for this elite even during the Third Reich; political involvement alone was not sufficient to attain leadership positions in the economy. The notable exceptions were board members of public enterprises who, in some instances, owed their position to their political activities. But their careers came

to an end after 1945, if only because they lacked the necessary know-how to navigate through the tough years of reconstruction that lay ahead.

Throughout the twentieth century, from the empire to the Federal Republic, the economic elite was characterized by a high level of social exclusivity. This is borne out in the various essays that deal with social background, *Heiratsverhalten* (connubial behavior), and social values. Until most recently, more than 50 percent of the economic elite came from the ranks of the haute bourgeoisie — entrepreneurs, the managerial class, the professions and high officials. The percentage with a middle or working-class background remained below 15 percent. The high percentage of self-recruitment from families of the *Bürgertum's* upper echelons is explained by the fact that socialization markers, personality traits, manners and comportment of the *haute bourgeoisie* were unstated preconditions for success. Undoubtedly, the element of cooptation also played a role: one naturally felt more at ease with people whose background, upbringing, education, and language were similar to one's own. As might be expected, the same pattern prevailed when it came to marriage. Ingo Köhler, dealing with marriage practices of private bankers, shows in his article that marriage often resembled a commercial transaction. The increasing competition with large public banks compelled private bankers to augment their fortunes through judicious selection of partners. Their instrumental choice to marry into money naturally limited the pool of eligible spouses.

In assessing bourgeois values, Cornelia Rauh-Kühne maintains that *bürgerliche* forms of life, so typical of the nineteenth century, were largely preserved until well into the post World War II period, though the conspicuous opulence of turn-of-the-century households fell by the wayside after 1945. A rigid and conscious demarcation from one's social inferiors continued unabated. Bourgeois values were thus perpetuated across the chasms of the twentieth century: the ideal of *Bildung*, the ethos of work and *Leistungsbereitschaft*, together with other central tenets of bourgeois identity, remained strongly internalized.

While the bulk of previous research on the subject has concentrated for the most part on the period between the late eighteenth century and the First World War, *Grossbürger und Unternehmer* focuses on the twentieth century. Each article is carefully prepared for publication, clearly presented, well-structured with subheadings and thus eminently accessible. The authors are fully abreast of current trends in international research as documented by the exhaustive use of primary and secondary sources. The volume thus serves as a welcome and up-to-date introduction to the German economic elite of the twentieth century.

HERMANN BECK
UNIVERSITY OF MIAMI

Imre Lakatos and the Guises of Reason. By John Kadvany. Durham: Duke University Press. 2001. Pp. xx + 378. $23.95. ISBN 0–8223–2649–3.

Imre Lakatos (1922–1974) is best known as a philosopher of science, who, along with his contemporaries Thomas Kuhn, Paul Feyerabend, and Karl Popper, changed the understanding of scientific method and practices during the philosophy and history of science debates in the 1960s and 1970s. The volume under review is not a biography of Imre Lakatos, but rather an analysis of Lakatos's English-language works in order to prove that there is a covert (Hegelian) philosophy embedded in the writing of a pupil of Karl Popper. Lakatos's philosophy of science and mathematics contains "an original and instructive account of historical rationality deriving from Hegel, Marx, and the Hegelian-Marxism of one of Lakatos's teachers in Hungary, Georg Lukács" (p. 1). John Kadvany, a principal at the management consulting firm Policy and Decision Science in California, paints a picture of a very talented, fascinating, and complicated mind — that of Imre Lakatos. "Lakatos's philosophy is such a puzzle inside a riddle inside an enigma" (p. 7).

Lakatos uses Hegel, much of whose work he only knew through the writings of Karl Marx and Georg Lukács, to historicize the philosophy of mathematics and science. According to Kadvany, the Hegelian substratum in Lakatos's work has three perspectives: "the philosophy of mathematics contained in *Proofs*, the philosophy of science of Lakatos's methodology of scientific research programs, and the distinctive irrationalism of Stalinist Hungary" (p. 14). Lakatos makes history central to scientific reason, and *Proofs*, his great philosophical achievement, is mathematics as history. Lakatos borrows Hegel's philosophical historiography and makes historiography the organizing idea for all of his philosophical works. Lakatos also replaces the traditional search for certainty with a historical portrayal of different conceptions of proof changing over time.

Imre Lakatos employs Hegel's footnote apparatus "to detail actual history, criticize other historians, and comment on the dialogue" (p. 38). Footnotes allow Lakatos to provide the time of "actual history" in his understanding of three overlapping sequences of historical time; the other two being; reconstructed time of the dialogue and the reader's and narrator's present time. Lakatos often expressed this understanding by way of a joke that "history of science is frequently a caricature of its rational reconstructions; that rational reconstructions are frequently caricatures of actual history; and that some histories of science are caricatures both of actual history and of its rational reconstructions" (p. 213). According to Lakatos and Hegel, caricatures represent the imperfections of historical knowledge and the dependence of history on interpretative theory. Popper, as well, believes in the fallibility of scientific knowledge, but Kadvany emphasizes that for Lakatos this also applied to historical knowledge.

Lakatos and Hegel believe that historiography is a reconstruction of representations, not events (p. 219).

Kadvany successfully argues that Lakatos's work leads back to the years of Stalinist Hungary before the 1956 revolution. The last chapter on the Hungarian revolution is "an object lesson in a type of irrationalism that is intimately related historically and conceptually to much in Lakatos's work" (p. 3). The goal of this chapter, "Hungary 1956 and the Inverted World," is to use Lakatos's dual philosophy as a means to understand the 1956 revolution as well as Hungarian Stalinism in general. Kadvany provides a thorough background on the individuals and Hungarian communism during this time, especially by emphasizing the falsity that pervaded Hungarian life. "Stalinist Hungary was a complete *Lebenslüge*: a life of lies in politics, culture, business, industry, agriculture, and everyday life" (p. 269).

During the years after the Second World War, Imre Lakatos was a devout Stalinist; he was a "cog in the Soviet-Hungarian power machine" (p. 288). The great educator, Lakatos was the main individual behind destroying the Eötvös College, as well as the person associated with the suicide of Éva Izsák, whose overcoat was appropriated by Lakatos's future wife. This Lakatos has been all but forgotten when Lakatos fled to England after the war and supposedly changed his views.

In viewing the duality of Lakatos (the disciple of Popper and the Hegelian) with the history of ideas of the 1956 Hungarian revolution — "falsification and the quest for truth, personality cult and elites, dissembling and betrayal, and self-criticism" — the English Lakatos wants to portray Hungary as a real danger of irrationalism. The Hegelian Lakatos uses explanations of scientific and mathematical method to criticize Hungarian Stalinism. Kadvany points out that Hungarian Stalinism may be rejected, but he wonders if one should then reject the heroic transformation out of Stalinism via self-criticism. "The value-laden interpretation of caricature as mendacious representation is intrinsic to Lakatos's historicism as a potentially nefarious transformation of ideas" (p. 301).

Some readers of this book may focus on the political and intellectual story of the 1956 Hungarian revolution, since implicit in John Kadvany's explanation of Lakatos's duality and his actions before 1956 is that Lakatos's belief in Hegelian historicism and Hegel's, as well as Popper's understanding of ideas and culture as independent from the individuals who created them (pp. 3, 143), may prevent us from judging Lakatos's actions during Stalinist Hungary. But this reviewer hopes that others will see the real merit in this book and that is Kadvany's description of Lakatos's use of Hegelian ideas to revolutionize our understanding of science and mathematics, as well as most subjects of study.

John Kadvany has written a brilliant study of the English-language philosophy of Imre Lakatos, which should appeal to scholars interested in the philosophy of science and mathematics, Stalinist Hungary, and Hegelian historical

rationality, as well as the individual of Imre Lakatos. Scholars in all subjects should welcome Kadvany's explanation of Lakatos's belief in three overlapping sequences of historical time. Even readers not versed in mathematical proofs and Lakatos's contribution to science, will not be disappointed with this well-written monograph.

JOHN C. SWANSON
UTICA COLLEGE OF SYRACUSE UNIVERSITY

Friedmann, Gutmann, Lieben, Mandl, Strakosch: Fünf Familienporträts aus Wien vor 1938. By Marie-Theres Arnbom. Vienna: Böhlau. 2002. Pp. 248. EUR 29.90. ISBN 3–205–99373–x.

The author is a Viennese historian who has written the history of five prominent Austro-Jewish families. They came to Vienna from the wider Habsburg realm: Bohemia, Moravia, and Hungary, where most had begun to make their fortunes. Once in Vienna, they tended to settle in the Leopoldstadt Bezirk, the destination of many eastern Jews, until they moved to the choicest areas of town. Arnbom draws a picture of families highly integrated with non-Jewish Viennese society, as some were even ennobled. Integration, sometimes assimilation to the point of giving up the Jewish faith, was key to the self-perception of these Jews as Austrians; one particularly interesting aspect of this is that they preferred peasant costumes such as lederhosen and dirndl dresses when on their sumptuous country estates in the Viennese hinterland. The impression of wealth possessed by these clans is stunning for the reader, but equally stunning is their sudden downfall after March 1938, when only a very few of these rich people could make short-term arrangements with the Nazi rulers, so as to escape abroad, for the price of their vast fortunes. I would have liked to read more about that aspect of the families' history, and also more about how they fared under the growing anti-Semitism of the First Republic, which culminated under chancellors Dollfuss and Schuschnigg. The latter's is a particularly complex case, because he was admired by and friends with several Jews of extreme right-wing proclivities, such as the conductor Bruno Walter.

Arnbom's kaleidoscopic history is brief but fascinating. The Mandls, physicians and merchants, ultimately make a name for themselves as munitions manufacturers. Ignaz Mandl becomes the mentor of the — later anti-Semitic — Karl Lueger, and Fritz Mandl, a Heimwehr supporter, before his emigration to Argentina in 1938 marries and divorces Hedy Kiesler, a beautiful Viennese Jewish girl, who then attains Hollywood fame as Hedy Lamarr. The Gutmanns deal in coal and iron; beyond that they are most active in charity, benefiting Jews and non-Jews alike, especially through the support of medical institutions. In

1929 Elsa Gutmann marries Franz I, the reigning prince of Liechtenstein. The industrialists of the Strakosch family manufacture and deal in sugar and textiles, but several of their cousins are artistically inclined, as is Alexander, a reciter, and Moritz, an impresario, not least in New York. Then there are the Friedmanns, who make a name for themselves as inventors of locomotive injector valves, but also as actors and politicians. Louis Friedmann, a playboy for the longest time, becomes a close friend of Arthur Schnitzler (who is connected to every one of these families, sometimes by marriage), figuring prominently in his play *Das weite Land*. As in Germany, the urge to be fully assimilated drives Jews like Louis Friedmann — he with a Gentile mother — to anti-Semitism, so that Schnitzler writes of him in the 1890s that he wished to remain childless in order not to pass on "the hated Jewish blood" (p. 169). The Friedmanns commission portraits of family members by John Quincy Adams Ward and Gustav Klimt. The Liebens too are active in high culture and the natural sciences, but they make their money with banks. Robert Lieben will attain everlasting fame as the inventor of the electronic tube that spurs telephony; Adolf Lieben is a university chemist, passing on this vocation to his son, Fritz. Fritz's younger brother Heinrich dies in March 1945 in a Nazi death camp.

In a slim book with as narrow a scope as Arnbom's several questions understandably could not be answered, and some are raised only by implication. Beyond examples of charity for poorer Jews (so as to quieten a guilty conscience), I would have liked to know more about the relationship between these rich families, desperate for social recognition in the highest Austrian circles, and the most impecunious orthodox Jews in characteristic eastern garb, many of whom Hitler allegedly spotted when roaming Leopoldstadt before World War I. Although Arnbom shows that most members of her Jewish families tended toward political liberalism, a more thorough analysis of their political allegiance — and how this shifted with the changing politics of the day — would have been enlightening. And so would have been a comparison of these clans with similar Jewish families in Germany — the Mendelssohns, Ballins, or Bleichröders. But on the whole this book contributes to a better understanding of modern European social history in general and the history of nineteenth and twentieth-century Central European Jews in particular.

MICHAEL H. KATER
THE CANADIAN CENTRE FOR GERMAN AND EUROPEAN STUDIES,
YORK UNIVERSITY

Die Aussenpolitik des Dritten 1933-1939. By Rainier F. Schmidt. Stuttgart: Klett-Cotta. 2002. Pp. 448. Eur 25.00. ISBN 3–608–94047–2.

There have been many studies of the foreign policies of Germany and other powers in the years leading up to the beginning of World War II in 1939 as well as examinations of specific crises in the 1930s and the roles of key individuals in those crises. In this book Rainer F. Schmidt of the University of Würzburg attempts a general survey. Rather than follow a primarily chronological route from Adolf Hitler's becoming chancellor to his initiation of war in 1939, Schmidt begins with a thematic approach that examines Germany's situation in the world in 1933, reviews the impact of World War I and the peace treaties, details the various approaches to foreign policy within the new German leadership, and characterizes key National Socialist leaders before covering the actual course of events in sequence. The book is based on a very selective and incomplete survey of the literature and minimal reference to hitherto unpublished evidence.

Although the author provides thoughtful and well-balanced discussions of the ideas and roles of such figures as Joachim von Ribbentrop and Hermann Göring, and also makes a serious effort to do justice to the leadership of English Prime Minister Neville Chamberlain, there are simply too many errors, omissions, and unsubstantiated assertions in the book to warrant its use by serious scholars. We see here many of the ancient clichés about the peace settlement of 1919 and the Weimar Republic. France is armed to the teeth, and Poland is similarly equipped. Although both Adolf Hitler and Joseph Goebbels announced the coup in Austria and the killing of Austrian Chancellor Engelbert Dollfuss the day before it happened, Schmidt still imagines it was all a local effort in Vienna. Since he is unfamiliar with German military activities, there is no reference to the decision to violate the Anglo-German Naval Agreement of 1935 in that same year. Endless quotations from the memoirs of the interpreter Paul Schmidt include the one about the reaction to the British declaration of war on 3 September 1939, that was shown to be a piece of fakery by Ernst Meier-Hermann in 1958!

In view of the author's very sensible discussion of Hitler's drive to war from the beginning of his rule as well as his success in obscuring this goal for years, a shrewd analysis of the cooperation Hitler received from Germany's bureaucratic and military elites, and a penetrating account of the interplay of ideas and institutions within the Nazi leadership, it is a pity that this book went into print without the searching review it badly needed.

If revised, the work could use a major addition of skepticism about the alleged "successes" of Germany in the 1930's. Was it really a success for Germany to build

up an air force in a world without heavy bombers? Some of the older residents of Würzburg might explain to him that when a country in the middle of Europe decides to build an air force in violation of its treaties and laws, other countries might follow that example with unfortunate effects for those who initiated a new arms race. As the German Federal Republic hopes some day to obtain the permanent seat on the Security Council of the United Nations Organization that the Weimar Republic obtained on the Council of the League of Nations in 1926, giving up that sign of status in 1933 as a recognized great power may no longer look like so great an accomplishment. Only one other example: one might compare the twelve years it took after 1918 for the last occupation troops to leave Germany with the forty-nine years after 1945.

GERHARD L. WEINBERG
UNIVERSITY OF NORTH CAROLINA-CHAPEL HILL, EMERITUS

Hitler's Ghettos: Voices from a Beleaguered Society 1939–1944. By Gustavo Corni. Translated from the Italian by Nicola Rudge Iannelli. London: Arnold (co-published in the United States by Oxford University Press). 2003. Pp. x + 358. $24.95. ISBN 0 340 76246 2.

Whatever was in the minds of the editors of Arnold Publishers when they let this manuscript, translated from the Italian, go forward for publication encrusted with a ponderous prose, with an academic presentation foreign to English-language readers, and with an unnecessarily cumbersome bibliographical apparatus? And whatever are the expectations of Oxford University Press, the United States distributors, when they market this volume to an undergraduate audience whose instructors presumably seek to promote literacy, clarity, and scholarly fluency?

Gustavo Corni, a professor of contemporary history at the University of Trento, Italy, wrote this manuscript with an entirely respectable objective — to analyze for his readers a large corpus of diaries, memoirs, and secondary literature on the East European ghettos imposed upon the Jews by the Nazis during the course of the Holocaust. The subject is important, and deserves a good synthesis. Unfortunately, because of linguistic limitations, his work omits a large volume of material in Yiddish, Hebrew, and Polish — a serious but perhaps not fatal deficiency, given the very considerable volume of material the author has read in English and German. Corni does not claim to be definitive. However, he does demand the attention of English-language readers over the course of more than three hundred pages, and this is the main problem with this book.

Readers will know that something is amiss when they see authors' first

names abbreviated, in the unfortunate, formal European academic convention — as in R. Hilberg, H. Arendt, Y. Gutman, and so forth — or notice oddly insufficient or off-target identifiers — e.g., "R. Hilberg, author of a seminal book on the destruction of the European Jews," or "the philosopher G. Scholem," or "M. Gilbert, one of the most important historians of the extermination of the Jews." Poor "P. Levi" — that is, Primo Levi, perhaps the greatest writer to have emerged from the Holocaust — slips into the text, as do so many others, without any identification at all. Style aside, the failure properly to situate in their context the diarists and memoirists, whose perspectives Corni rightly seeks to promote, is another deficiency of this work. "E. Ringelblum," to take an important case, is summarily referred to as "the historian Ringelblum," and the reader who wants to find out more about this key witness, about whose published volume there has been important controversy, must simply pick his way through the index references — only to be disappointed in the end. (Another case, L. Dawidowicz, questionably designated "an authoritative scholar," is wrongly referred to as "a survivor of the ghettos" [p. 63], when in fact Lucy Dawidowicz spent the war in New York.)

Poor translation may account for some of the mangled prose — as in "a more well-founded criticism" (p. 91) or "the perceptiveness of the profound observation" (p. 105), or "testimony says" (p. 186) — although it is difficult to be sure without reference to the Italian original. (Corni praises his translator's "skill and accuracy.") However, there is an irreducible core, in this book, of sheer bad writing, suggesting to me that Arnold's editors must simply have been asleep on the job, not only with respect to academic presentation but also literary form. What else can one say about the regular recourse to the passive voice, the humming and hawing, and the constant roundabout expression? One of the author's favorite formulations involves a long wind-up before the pitch: "Generally speaking, it can be established that . . ." (p. 70), or "It can legitimately be asked whether it is possible to talk of . . ." (p. 71) or "Generally speaking, it can be claimed that . . ." (p. 94). And finally, there is an annoying tendency to go through a long, windy introduction to the obvious. An example: ". . . it is nonetheless possible to identify a considerable degree of complexity which reveals both the influence of circumstances existing before the war and the subsequent influence of the forced ghettoization which, with the passing of time, increasingly altered the previous situation" (p. 189).

Compounding these problems is the difficulty readers will have identifying Corni's sources — a significant shortcoming given that this book is supposed to be a gateway to the voluminous literature on the ghettos. There is no lack of notes: some sentences have more than one, and there are typically several hundred per chapter. These are awkwardly presented, however; they appear at the end of each chapter, and in short form after the book's first citation. For a full reference a diligent reader must flip back to the first citation, often in an earlier

chapter, or else begin a hunt through the three sections of bibliography at the end of the work. Not good.

Readers with the patience to put up with these problems and infelicities may find some reward, however. I found Corni's discussion of many topics both intelligent and informative. He has worthwhile discussions of German policy, the Judenräte, the Jewish police, economic, health and social issues, forced labor, ghetto liquidation, and Jewish resistance. He has a good grasp of the many-sided character of the history of the ghettos, and is widely attentive to the differences among different regions. Unfortunately, because of the many problems of presentation, I will be reluctant to recommend this work to students.

MICHAEL R. MARRUS
UNIVERSITY OF TORONTO

Memories of Kreisau and the German Resistance. By Freya von Moltke. Translated by Julie M. Winter. Lincoln: University of Nebraska Press. 2003. Pp. 87. $ 49.95. ISBN 0–8032–4669–2.

The village Krzyzowa in Western Poland used to be Kreisau in the Prussian Province of Lower Silesia. It was allotted to Poland at the Potsdam Conference of July 1945. The designation "Kreisau Circle" was applied by the Security Office of the SS to the group of oppositionals to the Nazi regime who first met there on Pentecost 1942 at the landed estate of Count Helmuth James von Moltke. The group was in effect a braintrust of the German Resistance against Hitler. The literature on the Kreisau Circle is by now copious. The many memoranda of the group have been published, as well as Moltke's correspondence with his wife Freya. Furthermore, there are many secondary works on the circle, including biographies of the members of the group. The booklet under review is, as its title indicates, a memoir. Memoirs often present considerable problems to the historian inasmuch as they tend to be written from a personal, limited point of view. But this is definitely not the case here. On the contrary, the reader gets more than one insider's account of a historical phenomenon: the author reconstructs the dynamics of an extraordinary set of men and women united by their rejection of the evils of the regime in power and at the same time by their vision of a better Germany.

If the ground rule of politics is to exercise power, the Kreisau people violated it. They were up against an overwhelming power structure that they had no chance to match. They were prepared to meet the terror and violence of the Nazi regime "only" with their humaneness, their persistent faith in the righteousness of their cause, and their definite plans for Germany after the Third Reich. I might even argue that their mode of resistance came close to Mahatma

Gandhi's prescription of passive resistance. After all, Moltke himself rejected the option of assassinating the tyrant — to be sure, not out of fear or cowardice, but largely because he thought the evil was so intrinsic that merely removing one person at the helm would not suffice.

The basis of the group's meetings was friendship. Recruiting itself from various layers of society and religious and political traditions, it could rely on mutual trust and authentic patriotism. There was considerable strength in withstanding the faith in the "Führer's" invincibility that pervaded wartime Germany, and in actually planning for the "aftermath" besides expecting it.

The Kreisau meetings bore little resemblence to revolutionary underground plotting. As a matter of fact, they took place in broad daylight. Many members of the group, like Moltke himself, were in official positions that would offer them a temporary camouflage of sorts vis-à-vis the Nazi bloodhounds. Freya von Moltke could comment on the "inner freedom" that she experienced while preparing for the meetings. Providing food for some ten people in wartime of course called for careful planning. In any case, visitors were rewarded for their long trips with special Silesian poppy-seed *Stollen* that was generally appreciated. Indeed there prevailed in the get-togethers of Kreisau a great deal of conspiratorial laughter. And then there was Pastor Harold Poelchau, "a Mozart-type man" who was the guardian angel of them all as of many resisters who were in distress.

I have been wondering all along, how in the tightly censored world of Nazism the many letters between Helmuth and Freya could escape detection. To be sure, the many letters of Ambassador Ulrich von Hassell, another resistance leader, also got through; but in that case the fellow-plotters were protected, however slightly, by pseudonyms. But the Moltkes were protected by Kreisau's postal mistress and her son, the letter carrier, whose loyalty to the Moltke family protected them from scrutiny. So there were "niches" after all in the tightly controlled supposedly "totalitarian" society of the Third Reich. It was not over evidence about Kreisau that the members of the circle — Adolf Delp, Hans Bernd von Haeften, Helmuth von Moltke, Adolf Reichwein, Adam von Trott zu Solz, Peter Yorck von Wartenburg — were caught and executed. Much, from a scholarly and human perspective, is to be learned from this beautiful volume. Furthermore, it is encouraging to note that, quite in the spirit of the Moltke family, the whole estate of Kreisau, now Krzyzowa, has become a meeting place for Polish-German understanding, promising a better coexistence in Europe.

KLEMENS VON KLEMPERER
SMITH COLLEGE

West German Industry and the Challenge of the Nazi Past, 1945–1955. By S. Jonathan Wiesen. Chapel Hill: The University of North Carolina Press. 2001. Pp. xiii + 329. $45.00. ISBN 0–8078–2634–0.

In the final scene of Margarethe von Trotta and Volker Schlöndorff's 1975 film, *The Lost Honor of Katharina Blum*, Dr. Lüding, CEO and publisher of the sensationalist, right-wing *Die Zeitung*, gives the eulogy at the funeral of his slain reporter, satanic Werner Tötges. With his domineering pose, tinted glasses, and dark overcoat, a crucifix by his side and the symbols of state and private power all around him, the sinister Lüding delivers a Goebbels-like speech on the threat left-wing terrorism poses to West Germany's most precious possessions: its "young democracy," its "pluralism," its "freedom of the press," and its priceless "diversity of opinion." The episode is a sardonic comment on the hypocrisy of a rapacious publishing empire, which in the pursuit of profits incites public hysteria, tramples on people's rights, and concocts wild lies as a matter of routine, but which, when the tables are momentarily turned, cynically wraps itself in the mantle of modern patriotism and poses as the loyal defender of freedom and democracy.

The notion of an unscrupulous business community adopting the language of social responsibility (and, after World War II, of liberal-democratic vigilance) to divert attention from its own unsavory role in the immediate past is not an invention of 1968ers such as Schlöndorff and von Trotta, of course. It goes back at least as far as the appearance of Heinrich Mann's *Der Untertan* in 1918. A long-standing trope of the German Left, industry's posturing to escape responsibility for its past and to appear as a force for good is now also the theme of this superb new study by Jonathan Wiesen, an assistant professor of history at Southern Illinois University.

Unlike the Left's overriding concern with debunking, Wiesen's principal goal is to examine West German industrialists' manipulation of their record under National Socialism and their self-rehabilitation efforts in the decade after 1945 from the vantage point of how they understood — and said they understood — themselves. The organizing principle of the book is the "relationship between collective memory and public relations" (p. 4). Wiesen rejects the school of thought associated with the work of Margarete and Alexander Mitscherlich on memory and uses instead the concept of collective memory as it was first proposed and practiced by the dean of "collective memory studies," the French sociologist Maurice Halbwachs (1877–1945). This approach bypasses the supposedly insoluble psychological problem of the truth or falsehood of the heart. It focuses instead on the manifest and self-conscious project of shaping a given historical memory, such as nations have undertaken in com-

memorating their collective experience of war with public memorials, national holidays, historical "master narratives," and similar undertakings.

Although West Germany's industrialists did not stage public ceremonies or build monuments for themselves, Wiesen shows that they did launch a massive effort constructing a public-relations narrative that exonerated their past behavior and justified their social role in the postwar period. This was, he contends, their collective memory in the making. The author carefully reconstructs the various permutations of the industrialists' effort, analyzing in the study's individual chapters the design, production, and marketing of cleaned-up company histories (e.g., Siemens, Krupp); sanitized narratives of heavy industry's relationship with Hitler and the Nazi regime (e.g., August Heinrichsbauer's *Schwerindustrie und Politik*); improbable hagiographies of implicated industrialists (e.g., Gert von Klass's 1957 biography of Albert Vögler); new, less confrontational models for tackling management-labor relations (the individualized approach associated with industrial psychology and "human relations"); interpretations of German heavy industry palatable to the Americans (Louis Lochner's *Tycoons and Tyrant*); and self-fashioning projects that equated the large-scale industrialist with the creative, individual inventor or entrepreneur and so made him into a cornerstone of Western Civilization — a bastion of Christian faith against the onslaught of Communist collectivism — from Weimar to the Cold-War 1950s.

The author's core idea of marrying the concept of collective memory to that of public relations is an exciting one, and he manages to make very effective use of it. He sheds a revealing light on the mentality of West German industrialists. He illuminates the tortuous process of creating a past that was at once usable and yet not a complete falsehood. He shows how Ruhr industrialists themselves did much to build the road that led from their tradition of paternalistic authoritarianism to a less dysfunctional mindset in the Federal Republic. All in all, he has written a first-rate book.

And yet, there is an unresolved problem in Wiesen's work. By equating the industrialists' public relations campaign with their collective memory, the author appears to blur an important distinction. Common sense suggests that there is a difference between public relations and collective memory. If one adheres to the concept of the social construction of memory as strictly as Wiesen does, however, it is not easy to tell exactly which is which. Does the difference lie in the element or degree of spin? Does it center on the distinction between sincerity and "bad faith" or outright lies — between facing up and covering up? Does the difference have to do with the relative success or failure of the public relations/memory project taking hold and acquiring a life of its own or gaining wider currency, both within and without the group? Does it concern different degrees of consensus or controversy over a given discourse?

Does it relate to the difference between a one-dimensionally positive construction and a more nuanced one that includes negative associations as well? Or does it, perhaps, relate more to the issue of reception than production? Wiesen does not tell us. In the absence of more sustained, theoretical discussion of the problem, we can only speculate. Perhaps, to get at the notion of evil that the German Left manages to capture so effectively, we cannot do entirely without the psychological interpretations of collective memory he dismisses at the outset? These are some of the questions one wishes the author could have addressed more fully.

KEES GISPEN
UNIVERSITY OF MISSISSIPPI

Familie, Frau und Gesellschaft: Studien zur Strukturgeschichte der Familie in Westdeutschland, 1945–1960. By Merith Niehuss. Göttingen: Vandenhoeck & Ruprecht. 2001. Pp. 425. EUR 56.00. ISBN 3–525–36058–4.

The literature on postwar German history is strewn with equally plausible references to both the continuities of German history from the Weimar era to the postwar years and to the discontinuities caused by total defeat and/or the rejection of the values that had led Germany into the abyss of World War II. Niehuss's aim in *Familie, Frau und Gesellschaft* is to delineate the contours of a "structural history of the family" that will enable her to resolve this debate, at least as it pertains to women's experience in West Germany from the war through the end of the 1950s. In this work, Niehuss creatively exploits government censuses from the 1950s and 1960s, microcensuses conducted to illuminate specific trends, and extensive sociological surveys from the period, all of which she succeeds in making accessible to the statistically challenged. She uses this material to good effect to provide a detailed, qualified, and differentiated picture of a time and place that had heretofore been painted with broad strokes, which inevitably distorted and obscured as much as they revealed. Indeed, one of the few generalizations that Niehuss ventures is that it is impossible to generalize accurately about the social history of the period.

Niehuss argues that the postwar period was one of deprivation, reconstruction, and readjustment lasting from the war through the end of the 1950s. It was at that point when the new level of prosperity and consumption, the plunging unemployment rate, and the coming of age of a new cohort of young adults who no longer suffered from the postwar gender and age imbalances, and whose mindset had not been permanently fixed by the war, came together to give rise to fundamentally different experiences and expectations of family life. One of

her major claims is that the conditions of postwar family life were determined less by long-term trends or social class than by the fateful impact of the war on individual families — including the loss of husbands (and potential spouses), the equally massive destruction of housing, and the impact of the resulting shortage of living space on private life, the transformation of women's work, and the implications of these new forms and rhythms of women's work on family relations.

Niehuss begins her account with an exploration of the manifold effects of the war, such as expulsions and detentions, on the demographic structure of the nation. She also gives prominent place to the housing question, which she sees as perhaps the single most important dimension of the postwar social question. She effectively analyzes the real history underlying the postwar divorce boom and convincingly shows that, despite the highly charged debate over the crisis of family and authority, the spike in the divorce rate primarily represented a response to pent-up wartime demand rather than a fundamental change in family life and values.

Niehuss's analysis of postwar family policy is especially interesting. Here, she shows that, although the government relied upon a combination of tax deductions and children's allowances to promote a family policy that was favorably contrasted with the morally tainted population policies of the Nazis, these policies were ineffective because only a relatively small segment of the population earned enough to benefit from these tax deductions. However, her claim that postwar family policy broke with the population policies of the Nazis would have benefited from a closer study of the continuities in both policy debates and personnel from the Weimar era to the Adenauer administration.

Familie, Frau und Gesellschaft also makes an important contribution to understanding the changing pattern of women's work across the 1950s and the connection of these changes to the war, the spread of consumerism, and the broader cultural and social changes of the 1960s. Niehuss argues that the transformation of women's work in the second half of the 1950s was characterized by two apparently contradictory trends: on the one hand, the desire on the part of many women to give up tedious and often laborious work at low-paying jobs that offered few prospects for advancement in favor of marriage and housework and, on the other, the equally well-documented tendency for women to break with traditional employment patterns and continue to work after marriage and children.

While this new pattern was attributable in part, as Niehuss notes, to the need for a second income in order to reconstitute in an age of rising consumerism the material foundations of household and family life that had been destroyed during the war, she also notes that such work tended to take on a dynamic of its own, engendering among such working women a heightened sense of freedom and an awareness of new possibilities open to them. However, rather than

offering a facile generalization to reconcile this contradiction, Niehuss instead plunges into a detailed analysis designed to show how these patterns were the outcome of strategies and choices that were themselves conditioned by the complex of factors, which collectively constitute the basis of her structural history of the family. The most important of these factors was obviously the need to work, but this was itself conditioned by the impact of the war on the male-female demographic balance, the ability of returning husbands to work, the presence of children and/or other family members (who could be both an incentive and an obstacle to work), changes in the organization of production and the availability of different kinds of jobs, and the extremely complex correlation between the desire to work and the type and degree of education possessed by these women (which was itself influenced, but not determined, by yet another chain of factors).

While these kinds of analytical chains represent the real strength of the book, in places Niehuss limits her analyses to a greater extent than required by her material. In view of the growing number of works that analyze the cultural constructions of gender and family in the framework of the Cold War and that focus on the politics of social policy, Niehuss's comprehensive analysis of demographic and economic factors is both valuable and defensible. However, in places — such as her discussions of the postwar divorce rate and the new patterns of married women's employment — the reader waits in vain for the author to assess the significance of her own data for these broader debates. Similarly, Niehuss identifies the origins of important social trends in the 1950s, but she argues that, to the extent that these developments signal the end of those problems that were the constitutive features of the postwar era, they lie outside the scope of her book.

Familie, Frau und Gesellschaft may not be the definitive work on the history of women and gender in the postwar years, but it is an important one that will have to be read carefully by anyone who does not believe in a complete disjunction between historical discourse and historical reality.

YOUNG-SUN HONG
STATE UNIVERSITY OF NEW YORK, STONY BROOK

Germany's Cold War: The Global Campaign to Isolate East Germany, 1949–1969. By William Glenn Gray. Chapel Hill: The University of North Carolina Press. 2003. Pp. xiii + 352. $49.95. ISBN 0–8078–2758–4.

In late January of 1965, after revelations of West German arms shipments to Israel, Egyptian President Gamal Abdul Nasser retaliated by inviting East

German leader Walter Ulbricht to visit Cairo. "Stalingrad on the Nile," one newspaper called it — an indication of the perceived scale of this West German diplomatic defeat. Would the Federal Republic maintain its policy of diplomatic and economic sanctions against any state that trafficked with its rival? For ten years, this policy, up to and including the threat to break off diplomatic relations (the Hallstein Doctrine), had succeeded in confining recognition of the so-called GDR to only two additional states beyond the Warsaw Pact and the Communist parts of Asia. After Bonn had severed relations with the first of those two states — Communist but nonaligned Yugoslavia — in 1957, only Communist Cuba had dared to test the precedent. Meanwhile, Bonn had deftly parried efforts by a smattering of nonaligned countries to test its tolerance for relationships with the GDR that fell short of full recognition. West German officials now feared that a failure to act against Cairo would set a new precedent. Seeing Bonn's bluff called, additional noncommunist countries might take steps toward ending the GDR's diplomatic isolation. Yet, as Foreign Minister Gerhard Schröder (CDU) noted, enforcing the policy might well boomerang. Given Nasser's touchiness and his standing in the Arab world, even limited sanctions might result in ceding all the "German" embassies in the Arab region to Ulbricht. In the end, after publicly threatening sanctions, Chancellor Ludwig Erhard failed to follow through. Instead, he halted the Israelis' arms shipments, but also chose this moment to take up diplomatic relations with Israel — whereupon Egypt and nine other states broke off their relations with West Germany.

Yet, "Stalingrad" turned out to be a Pyrrhic victory for the Soviets' German protégé. For another four years, neither Nasser nor any other foreign leader recognized East Berlin. By the early 1970s, Bonn's policy was in flux. Ceasing to threaten reprisals, it asked only that other states indulge it by not recognizing the GDR until Bonn completed the reconfiguration of its own German policy (the "Scheel Doctrine"). Even then, only a few noncommunist states recognized the GDR before the German-German treaty of December 1972. "The East German regime," writes William Glenn Gray, "had remained on the fringes of international life precisely as long as West Germans wanted it to" (p. 219).

On first glance, this is a startling conclusion. Throughout the later 1960s, the GDR did register incremental gains in consular and lower-level state-to-state relations. Even more via nongovernmental organizations, it advanced beyond the fringes well before "West Germans wanted it to." Just months after "Stalingrad," for example, the International Olympic Committee finally granted Ostdeutschland its own Olympic team. A year later, the IOC awarded the 1972 games to Munich only after having extracted a promise from the West German government that all teams would be permitted to use their state's symbols. Examples such as these are an indication of the extent to which West

Germany's eventual change of policy — from isolating to "embracing" the GDR, as Egon Bahr put it — came about because the old policy was producing diminishing, or negative, foreign returns. In other words, not only a rationale but also a set of circumstances recommended the change of policy. On one level, Bahr's rationale was his creative attempt to make a virtue out of what seemed to him to be a circumstantial necessity.

Even so, Gray's thrust is well directed. As he shows, Bonn was loathe to invoke its ultimate sanction: breaking diplomatic relations. Like nuclear weaponry, this sanction was better employed as a deterrent than as a weapon. As for lesser sanctions, the Foreign Ministry proved endlessly inventive in avoiding their use by combining threats and inducements. The result was a growing mound of special dispensations or "managed relationships" with third countries. Still, deterrence worked. What seemed to the West like a slippery slope seemed in East Berlin like a labor of Sisyphus. East German diplomacy advanced only by baby steps, and every seeming step forward was quickly dogged by the dissimulations through which otherwise inconsequential third countries like Ceylon and Guinea frustratingly took back most of what they had just given.

Bonn had diplomatic assets that East Berlin could not match. Although this leverage was in part financial, the use of such assets invited extortion, a reality that tempted third countries to try to raise the stakes by testing Bonn at every turn. In short, the Federal Republic's policy of quarantining the GDR encouraged ever-newer challenges. The benefits of those challenges, however, accrued to those that Bonn bought off, not to East Berlin.

Bonn's assets were more than financial. Among them were Washington's vigorous diplomatic support, Moscow's uncertain early German policy, the Kremlin's later reluctance to pressure the third-world states that it was courting to risk the loss of West German financial aid, and East Berlin's dilettantish and overreaching diplomacy. Konrad Adenauer's assiduous development of integrative Western European institutions placed his diplomats in the new third-world capitals before Ulbricht's; Bonn thereby profited from multinational institutional leverage while simultaneously offering newly independent states an alternative mentor to the former mother country. Partly as a result of these factors, the East and West German hard lines had globally asymmetric consequences.

As Gray points out, Bonn succeeded in countering the GDR's antiimperial rhetoric by deploying a favorite third-world ideal, national self-determination, to reinforce its superior claim to political legitimacy in Germany. Thus, even though the Berlin Wall ended the expectation that the GDR might prove ephemeral, it did not bestow diplomatic parity. Whereas one of the most influential nonaligned leaders, Indian Prime Minister Jawaharlal Nehru, had considered heretofore that peace in Europe required international contacts with the East Germans, the post-Wall diminution of the crisis atmosphere actually

reduced his incentive to recognize a regime with so little domestic legitimacy that it had to lock up its own people. Moreover, far from being a blunt tool, Bonn's doctrine of sole representation could be creatively interpreted in such a way that Bonn itself could violate the letter of it much more easily than third countries could. First Adenauer in opening relations with Moscow, then Schröder with his "policy of movement" in Eastern Europe, later Chancellor Kiesinger and Foreign Minister Brandt, and finally Chancellor Brandt and Foreign Minister Scheel all devised corollaries or variations that enabled Bonn to extend its own diplomacy into those areas of the world that were supposedly rendered off limits by its own doctrine.

This story reinforces the view that Bonn had alternatives to the policies it eventually chose under Willy Brandt. As Gray indicates, the Soviet crushing of the Prague Spring led the two major parties to articulate those choices. Even if the policy of isolating rather than "embracing" the GDR was tattered, it was not dead until Bonn killed it. On this issue, writes Gray, Bonn was accommodated rather than pressured by its détente-seeking allies. Only after the Prague Spring did the relative priority of precluding East Berlin's penetration of the third world give way unambiguously in Bonn to facilitating its own penetration of the second world. While this choice of policy was primarily a matter of priorities, it also concerned strategies. For unlike the consistently anti-Hallstein FDP, much of the post-Godesberg SPD had long persisted in believing that the two goals remained compatible.

Buttressed by an international range of archival sources, Gray has produced a lively and erudite account of an area of West German diplomacy that is too often written off as wooden and one-dimensional. As he shows, Bonn's doctrine was neither rigid nor unimaginatively wielded. In the hands of Adenauer, it was one tool toward an end, not an unalterable principle. Erhard's use of it was considerably less sure-handed; yet, it was during the transition from Adenauer to Erhard that Schröder's effort to square the circle — to reconcile the policy of isolating the GDR with a policy of engagement with the Eastern bloc — began to make limited headway. That a choice eventually was made was due less to the imperfect effectiveness of the policy in isolating the GDR than to the recognition that isolation too was a means rather than an end.

NOEL D. CARY
COLLEGE OF THE HOLY CROSS

A Carnival of Revolution: Central Europe 1989. By *Padraic Kenney.* Princeton: Princeton University Press. 2002. Pp. 341. $29.95. ISBN 0–691–050–267.

Kenney's East Central European "carnival" is a Bakhtinian street game of demonstrations and arrests staged by the alternative "scene" during the mid- and late 1980s in places like Leipzig, Teplice, Wroclaw, and Lviv. Reminiscent of San Francisco circa 1969, the East European carnival was also a space for the politics of the "happening" and for demonstrating one's independence, autonomy, and honesty in societies weighed down by prevarication and conformity. The carnival was a place to join hands, have some fun, and show courage in an atmosphere of passivity and fear. The revelers at the East Central European carnival were often anonymous and plain folks. Sometimes they were hippies, disaffected students, and eccentric activists of one sort or another. What joined them together was their alienation from the government and party on the one hand and from high-minded intellectuals and institutionalized opposition (Solidarity, most particularly) on the other. They were what Kenney calls *konkretny*, people of action and deeds, not of fancy words and abstract principles. Kenney's attitude toward the "big names" is clear. When they got together, they tended to exchange "platitudes about human rights, issued joint declarations, and (most important) got to know each other," while the *konkretny* did the real work of revolution, conspiracy, and getting people involved actively in change (p. 109).

If there is a single thesis to this engaging and informative book, it is that these people — most of whose names are new to scholars and students of 1989 — contributed in significant ways to the East European revolution. Gorbachev played a role in allowing new possibilities for democratic action in Communist societies in the late 1980s, as did opposition politicians and the weakened Communist states themselves. But the real revolution, Kenney claims, was made by groups like the "Orange Alternative" and "Freedom and Peace" in Poland, the "Initiative for Peace and Human Rights" in the German Democratic Republic, the "John Lennon Peace Club" and "Independent Peace Association" in Czechoslovakia, FIDESZ in Hungary, the *Mladina* group in Slovenia, and the Lviv "Lion Society" in Ukraine. According to Kenney, the activities of these groups (and others) empowered members of the young generation to express their views on the streets. The crowds of 1989 — and their demands — are inconceivable, he argues, without the actions and involvement of the social movements of the previous half decade. Yet when the great changes finally came in 1989 and 1990, these movements were left for the most part in the background, both by the new political forces in the countries involved, and by their historians.

Kenney's sources include over three hundred interviews, as well as contem-

porary newspapers, leaflets, and brochures published in the underground. He also uses personal and *samizdat* archives. But his method is primarily that of an oral historian. The testimony and recollections of witnesses and participants are central to his reconstruction of events. This has the advantage of presenting the reader with informative, dramatic, and even poignant first-hand accounts. We get a genuine feeling for the travails of this diverse generation of nonconformist activists, some of whom end up embittered in isolated mountain cottages dedicated to "deep ecology," while others after 1989 turn to founding marketing and public relations firms. On the other hand, the absence of sources like police reports — surely, for example, the Stasi were extremely well-informed about the alternative scene in Leipzig and elsewhere in the region — leaves one with the sense that perhaps a consideration of security organizations, informers, and "high politics" might mitigate the somewhat romantic vision of the *konkretny* and their organizations.

A Carnival of Revolution is very cleverly and attractively organized into three discrete sections, each accompanied by a "time line" including the founding of organizations and important events. In the first, "Actors, Stages, Repertoires," Kenney analyzes the origins and development of the alternative movement in East Central Europe. The second section is a lovely photo essay on the "movement." The photographs are carefully annotated and documented, and illustrate a number of major points made in the text: the youthful character of the participants; the diverse scenes of their "actions" — rivers, town squares, factories, rural paths, and underground apartments; and the connections between Poles, Czechs, Slovaks, Hungarians, Germans, and Ukrainians, up in the mountains, as they joined across borders, and in common demonstrations. The final section presents a series of sixteen scenes or "snapshots from a vanished world," as Kenney calls them, that tell the story of interconnectedness of the East European events of 1988–1989 and the ways in which the various alternative movements shaped (and didn't) the fall of Communist regimes in the region. Each of these short essays is a successful blending of high journalism and contemporary history. Kenney is a fine writer and he knows the territory and its inhabitants well. Historians and teachers of the East European Revolution of 1989 are in his debt for a study that will be useful both for understanding the collapse of communism in the region and for teaching students about the multiplicity of forces that swept away the old regime.

NORMAN M. NAIMARK
STANFORD UNIVERSITY

Repainting the Little Red Schoolhouse: A History of Eastern German Education, 1945–1995. By John Rodden. New York: Oxford University Press. 2002. Pp. xxx + 506. $74.00. ISBN 0–19–511244–X.

The title of this book does not tell what it is about, at least not fully. It is indeed the most complete treatment of East German education that has appeared in English, yet most of the book does not touch upon schools or schooling. What really interests Rodden, author of a major work on George Orwell, is the functioning of totalitarian society: working in "Orwell's decade" of the 1980s Rodden was drawn to the GDR for its "Orwellian flavor," including "Newspeak, Party-line rectifications, ideology of 'All animals are equal, but some [Party] animals are more equal than others,' and above all its mutable past" (p. xxiv). He divides the book into two sections, the first an extended meditation on East German history from 1945 to 1995, featuring frequent digressions into developments in education (four long chapters); followed by a series of personal glimpses of individuals and problems in the post-Communist period (nine short chapters).

Rodden justifies his dual history of society and education from a lesson taught by scores of interviews with students and teachers in East Germany, namely that "the deepest roots of DDR society were indeed located in the institution that molded the youth of its citizens" (p. 12). The story of the GDR is one of continuous unfolding of the totalitarian regime, from democratization to Sovietization and Stalinization, to the advanced socialism of the 1960s and 1970s. The author provides lively portrayals of the major events and turning points in the political realm, including 17 June 1953, and the repercussions of de-Stalinization in 1956, the building of the Wall in 1961, and the shattering of faith that followed the Prague Spring of 1968. He presents Honecker as a hopeful figure at first, who quickly squandered his popularity through acts of repression, such as the expulsion of Wolf Biermann in 1976.

Each of these stages has its reflection in the East German education system, from the "progressive" reforms of the early years endorsed by many Social Democrats as well as Communists, to the gradual adoption of Soviet norms (like planning) and pedagogy (A.S. Makarenko comes in for heavy criticism for his authoritarian methods), the full-scale imposition of communal learning in the late 1950s, and finally the militarized system of the post-Wall era. Education became the most effective lever imaginable for controlling society, because each advance through the socialist schools hinged upon demonstrated political conformity.

The book's second part diverges even further from a concentrated focus on East German education — at least in the official, institutional sense. Rather, this section consists of interviews with East German educators about the compro-

mises they faced in advancing their careers, or the challenges they overcame in order to oppose the regime in subtle ways. Rodden relates these conversations in an accessible, journalistic style, with vivid portrayals of place. Time is a dimension that often seems suspended, however: though the interviews took place in the early 1990s, Rodden repeatedly feels drawn back into situations from the deeper German past — whether in the apparent recurrence of utopianism in several generations of East Germans, the constant renewal of stark moral choices, or the seemingly inescapable presence of disquieting figures like Hitler or Nietzsche in Germany's public places.

Those familiar with interviews conducted by Lutz Niethammer, Alexander von Plato, and Dorothee Wierling, or the writings of Irene Böhme, Günter Gaus, or Timothy Garton Ash will find the situations familiar, though arguably Rodden's ex post facto perspective permits bolder probing into the infernal games of self-justification that many East Germans played in order to get by. The social scientist will find Rodden's approach more descriptive than analytical: in the end he provides little general guidance as to why certain East Germans acted as they did. Take for example the heroine of the Saxon town of Plauen, Frau Anneliese Saupe, who used senior citizen status to smuggle information about demonstrations across the border in October 1989. The background provided on her life tells little about what might have disposed her to heroic behavior. Similarly, interviews with university lecturers give only the most basic clues about motivation, and in some cases parents seem to predispose children for or against the regime, while in other cases the decisive factor seems to be generational.

If not explanation, the author's modus operandi seems more one of wonderment, with occasional celebrations of virtue, through a series of finely drawn encounters with inhabitants of a very foreign place, backed up by much intelligent rumination on the substance of memory, integrity, and the role of the past in the present. Some readers may question an occasional lapse into historical momentousness that borders on the metaphysical. For example on the reopening at the Nietzsche archive, Rodden wonders: "With Zarathustra Unbound, what repressed energies from the East German past will finally also be released? With the resurrection of the antichrist, are the droves of disciples soon to follow?" (p. 289).

Though generally competent, and always lively, the historical narrative does occasionally suffer from avoidable errors of fact (Czechoslovak territory was not given to Germany in 1936; the elections of 1933 were not free; the first free election in East Germany was not in December 1990). Rodden draws upon a diverse array of sources, including contemporary newspaper reports, and a vast body of secondary literature, but regrettably not recently opened archives. Perhaps evidence taken from direct observation would have permitted more binding conclusions on the power of new curricula to transform political beliefs

and behavior. But as it stands, Rodden's work evokes the dilemmas of everyday totalitarianism with unusual poignancy, and it is to be warmly recommended to all those wanting to probe the deeper currents of social reality in the "former East Germany."

JOHN CONNELLY
UNIVERSITY OF CALIFORNIA, BERKELEY

Naziland Österreich!?: Studien zu Antisemitismus, Nation und Nationalsozialismus im öffentlichen Meinungsbild. By Heinz P. Wassermann. Schriften des Centrums für Jüdische Studien, vol. 2. Innsbruck: Studien Verlag. 2002. Pp. 230. EUR 22.00. ISBN 3-7065-1661-6.

Heinz P. Wassermann's comprehensive overview of the responses to public opinion surveys, admittedly of considerably varying density and quality, on the subjects of anti-Semitism, Austrian national consciousness, and Austrian attitudes to Nazism from the middle 1940s to the end of the 1990s is not history (it does not claim to be) but the stuff that history can be made from. Dr. Wassermann claims to be producing the first, systematic, quantitative analysis — the results of all of the various and sundry surveys made on these themes in postwar Austria. The results of these polls have been evaluated with respect to the age of the respondents. The analysis, which does not go beyond that, yields the thesis that the older the respondent, the greater the "proximity" to Nazism reflected in his/her responses. In a word, as history goes, at least, this is pretty thin stuff and anything but what the provocative title would lead putative readers to expect.

The historical questions that polls raise are rarely mere quantitative matters. Rather, historians want to know what the polls mean. How should they be interpreted? This bears upon their relationship to previous surveys. Statistical significance is directly related to changes in the statistics. However, it is anything but a secret that subtle variations in the mode of posing questions can significantly alter, or even manipulate, results. So there are prima facie reasons for questioning how sensible it is to combine the results of all of the polls taken over half a century (in English as well as German) on three such difficult and elusive issues. Perhaps this point can be best illustrated if we consider the question of Austrian national consciousness. Is Austria a nation? Is Austria's nationhood a matter of the Austrian state or a matter of the common German language? Is Austrian German? Unlike questions relating to anti-Semitism and Nazism, it is unclear what is at stake in posing the question, i.e., what the significance of any possible answer might be. To clarify the matter a bit further,

obviously enough, in any liberal society being anti-Semitic or Nazi is a grave matter. So there will be "right" and "wrong" answers to questions about those topics in the eyes of everyone involved (including anti-Semites or Nazis mutatis mutandis). However, with respect to the idea of Austrian nationhood both experts and patriots might in given circumstances answer either yes or no to any question, depending upon what was at stake. The crucial issues will be "a nation, national state, linguistic nation, German — nation? as opposed to what?" Wassermann explicitly recognizes such issues and explicitly discusses some relevant problems in connection with Karl Dietrich Erdmann's highly controversial thesis that the object of German history after the postwar division of Germany was in fact one people, two nations and three states, but Wassermann does nothing more than to record the terms of the controversy. He makes no effort to come to grips with the conceptual problems that such a debate poses, i.e., he is not interested in questioning presuppositions. This may be his prerogative as an analyst of public opinion but, for all the comprehensive character of his overview, it is at best a matter for scholarly scrutiny on the part of historians.

The book itself has been produced in a most curious, user unfriendly way. It contains no information about the author (except a few scant references in the bibliography). Although it is the second publication of some Center for Jewish Studies, no location for such a center is given nor is there any indication of what the earlier publication was. However, none of this is much help to a librarian or bibliographer. In fact a careful reading of the acknowledgments of financial support the book has received points to Graz as the place where the series originates. As the Internet tells us, there is indeed a David Herzog Center for Jewish Studies, which presumably edits the series. However, none of this is referred to in the volume. This is clearly not the way to publish a book.

In short, *Naziland Österreich* is full of facts, which, in the best of cases, have been but scantily interpreted. Indeed, it is questionable if one can map the results of so many different, disparate polls onto a single matrix without further distortion as Wassermann would do (the fact that some surveys were in English and others in German would indicate this). At best the book might serve as the basis of a historical case study on the hermeneutics of interpreting public opinion polls.

If this is unfair to the author's efforts in compiling the book, which it well might be, I would suggest that it is because he has not spelled out what he is in fact up to in the book in a manner which is comprehensible to somebody who is not of his guild. In the end this book is symptomatic of what unreflective specialization is doing to intellectual life today.

ALLAN JANIK
THE BRENNER ARCHIVES, UNIVERSITY OF INNSBRUCK